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PROVINCIAL FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST NATIONS:
THE NEXUS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY©
By LEONARD

The Canadian Crown's fiduciary duty to First Nations is
entrenched in Canadian Aboriginal rights
jurisprudence. More than ten years after the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Guerin, however, yet to
be ascertained are the various emanations of the Crown
bound by that duty. This paper argues that both federal
and provincial Crowns are properly bound by fiduciary
obligations to First Nations. It also suggests that the
basis of this assertion may be found in existing
jurisprudence, the Canadian Constitution, the spirit
and intent of Indian treaties, and in Aboriginal
understandings of "the Crown."

I. RoTmAN*
Que la Couronne canadienne ait une obligation
flduciaire envers les Premieres Nations est implant6 par
la jurisprudence canadienne en matiare de droits des
autochtones. N6anmoins, plus de dix ans apr~s la
decision Guerin de la Cour supreme du Canada, il reste
tablir quelles sont les 6manations de la Couronne
li6es par ladite obligation. Cet article soutient que les
deux Couronnes provinciale et f6d6rale sont
correctement lises par des obligations fiduciaires
envers les Premisres Nations. Larticle sugg6re aussi
que la base de cette proposition peut se trouver dans la
jurisprudence actuelle, la Constitution canadienne,
l'esprit et l'intention des trait6s indiens, et les
compr6hesions aborigines de la Couronne.

L INTRODUCTION ............................................................

IL JURIDICAL TREATMENT OF CROWN OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST NATIONS

736

....

740

A. Overview ..................................................................

740

B. St Catherine'sMilling .......................................................

742

C. Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,Seybold, and Treaty #3Annuities ......................

747

1. Robinson TreatiesAnnuities ................................................

748

2. Seybold ................................................................

754

3. Treaty #3 Annuities ......................................................

758

D. Summary and Conclusions ...................................................

760

© 1995, LI. Rotman.
* B.A. (University of Toronto), LL.B. (Queen's University), LL.M. (Osgoode Hall Law
School), SJ.D. Candidate (University of Toronto), of the Bar of Ontario. Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
University of Windsor.

736

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL

32 NO. 4

H. RECENT JUDICIAL INFERENCES OF PROVINCIAL FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
TO FIRST NATIONS .........................................................
763
A. s i ....................................................................
763
B. Gardner...................................................................
765
C. CreeRegionalAuthorityandDelgamuukw .......................................
766
D. BearIsland ................................................................
767
E. Summary and Conclusions ...................................................
769
IV. ABORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF "THE CROWN" ........................

769

V. THE NEXUS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY ...........................................................

778

VI. CONCLUSION ..............................................................

781

I. INTRODUCrION
In the landmark case of Guerin v. R,1 the Supreme Court of
Canada unanimously declared that the relationship between the Crown2

and First Nations3 was fiduciary in nature. Since that time, the number

of claims by First Nations alleging breaches of the Crown's fiduciary

1 [1984] 2 S.C.R. (4th) 335 [hereinafter Guerin].
2 For the purposes of this paper, the use of the term "the Crown" refers to the sovereign
power and position of the body that possesses ultimate responsibility for discharging the fiduciary
obligations to First Nations incurred in its name. Where specific emanations of the Crown are
indicated, those distinctions will be clearly made in the text.
3 The terms "First Nations," "Aboriginal peoples," "Native peoples," and "Indians" will be
used interchangeably to refer to those people who are encompassed within the definition of
Aboriginal peoples in section 35(2) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter ConstitutionAct, 1982]-namely Indian, Inuit, and M6tis
peoples of Canada--and to reflect their use in judicial decisions and legislation. For a more
detailed discussion of these terms, see C. Chartier, '"Indian': An Analysis of the Term as Used in
Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79) 43 Sask. L. Rev. 37; B. Slattery,
"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at note 18 and note 175; and,
generally, C. Bell, "Who Are the M6tis People in Section 35(2)?" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 351. See
also, P. Chartrand, "'Terms of Division': Problems of 'Outside-Naming' for Aboriginal People in
Canada" (1991) 2:2 J. Indig. Stud. 1; and T. Isaac, "The Power of Constitutional Language: The
Case Against Using 'Aboriginal Peoples' as a Referent for First Nations" (1993) 19 Queen's LJ.
415. For various legal definitions, see section 35(2) of the ConstitutionAct 1982; section 2(1) of the
IndianAct, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5; and Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104.
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obligations has steadily increased. 4

The Court later furthered this

finding in R. v. Sparrow5 by holding that the Crown's fiduciary duty to
First Nations was entrenched in section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct,
1982. Following the Sparrow decision, the judiciary's perception of the
Crown-Native relationship was completely transformed from its pre-

Guerin notions, which had viewed the Crown's obligations to First
Nations as moral, rather than legal, and certainly not binding:
The Indians must in the future ... be treated with the same consideration for their just
claims and demands that they have received in the past, but, as in the past, it will not be
because of any legal obligation to do so, but as a sacred political obligation, in the
execution of which the state must be free from judicial control. 6

More than a decade has passed Since Guerin was decided. In
that time, Canadian courts have not questioned the application of
fiduciary principles to the Crown-Native relationship. Rather, they now
hold as fundamental the notion that the Crown owes fiduciary
obligations to First Nations. 7 Unfortunately, while the number of cases
considering the fiduciary nature of the Crown-Native relationship
continues to increase at a substantial rate, the vast majority have done
little to enhance the juridical understanding of that relationship. Since
the Guerin decision, itself, failed to establish a sufficient basis for
4 Among the more prominent of these are Kruger v. R. (1985), 17 D.LR. (4th) 591 (F.C.A.),
aff'g (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (F.C.T.D.); Bruno v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and
NorthernDevelopment) (1990), [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 22 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Bruno]; Cree Regional
Authority v. Robinson, [1991] 4 C.N.LR. 84 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Cree RegionalAuthority];Lower
Kootenay Indian Band v. Canada(FederalAdministrator)(1991), [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 54 (F.C.T.D.);
EastmainBand v. Canada (FederalAdministrator)(1992), [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 55 (F.C.A.), rev'g (sub
nom. Eastmain Band v. Robinson), [1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 90 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Eastmain Band];
Apsassin v. Canada,[1993] 2 C.N.LR. 73 (F.CA), affg (sub nom. Apsassin v. Canada(Department
of IndianAffairs andNorthern Development)), [1988] 3 F.C. 3 (T.D.) [hereinafterApsassin].
5 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1108-09 [hereinafter Sparrow].
6 St. Catherine'sMilling and Lumber Co. y. Canada (A.G.) (subnom. St. CatharinesMilling and
Lumber Co. v. Canada (A.G.)) [1887] 13 S.C.P. 577 at 649 [hereinafter St Catherine'sMilling, SCC],
aff'g (sub nom. St. Cathednes Milling and Lumber Co. v. Canada (A.G.)) (1886), 13 O.A.R. 148
[hereinafter St. Catherine'sMilling, OCA], (sub nom. St. CatherinesMilling and Lumber Co. v.
Canada (A.G.)) (1886), 10 O.R. 196 (Ch.) [hereinafter St Catherine'sMilling, Ch], affd (1888), 14
A.C. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St Catherine'sMilling,PC]. Indeed, in the Federal Court of Appeal's
decision in Guerin, Le Dain JA. held that the Crown's obligations were no greater than politicallyor morally-based obligations: see (1982), 143 D.LR. (3d) 416 (F.CA) at 469-71.
7 See, for example, CanadianPacific Ltd. v.Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677; Roberts v. Canada,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at 337 and 339; Sparrow, supra note 5 at 1108-09; Bruno,supranote 4 at 27; Cree
RegionalAuthority,supra note 4 at 99; Ontario(A.G.) v. BearIslandFoundation, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570
at 573, aff'g (1989), 58 D.LR. (4th) 117 (Ont. C.A.), and (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. H.CJ.)
[hereinafter Bear Island];R. v. Vincent, [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 165 (Ont. CA.) at 179; Quebec (A.G.) v.
Canada (NationalEneW,Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159 at 182-85.
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determining the effects of the Crown's general fiduciary capacity toward
First Nations, this is hardly surprising.
The Guerin case centred around the nature and extent of the
federal Crown's obligations to the Musqueam band in regard to the
leasing of that band's land by the Crown to a third party on the band's
behalf. Although authorized by the band to lease out the land, the lease
in question did not meet certain conditions set out by the Musqueam
band. The Supreme Court of Canada determined that a fiduciary
relationship existed between the Crown and the band, due to the nature
of their interaction, and that the Crown had breached its duty to the
band by failing to lease the land in accordance with the specified terms.
In so doing, the Court answered the pivotal questions: Who were the
fiduciary and beneficiary? Why was the relationship between them
fiduciary in nature? How did the Crown's actions amount to a breach of
its obligations? And what was the basis of the awarded remedy? Since
its release, Guerin has been used to find fiduciary relationships between
the Crown and Aboriginal bands in a wide variety of situations.
The Crown-Native fiduciary relationship is actually comprised of
two distinct types of fiduciary relationships. One is a general duty while
the other is a specific duty. The Crown owes a general duty to First
Nations as a result of the historic relationship between the parties dating
back to the time of contact.8 The key characteristics of this relationship
are bilateral needs, respect, trust, and the mutually recognized and
respected sovereignty of both European and Aboriginal nations during
the formative years of the relationship. In addition to the Crown's
general duty, the Crown also owes specific fiduciary duties to certain
First Nations stemming from particular treaties, agreements, alliances, 9

8 The word "contact" has been purposely used in place of the more common term "discovery"
to describe the meeting of European and Aboriginal peoples in North America. This is due to the
historical fact that what is now known as North America was possessed and occupied by indigenous
peoples who inhabited, hunted, fished, trapped, and farmed the land well before Europeans were
aware of the New World's existence or possessed the ability to travel to its shores. "Contact"
suggests the reciprocity of discovery that followed upon European initiatives of exploration, for "as
surely as Europeans discovered Indians, Indians discovered Europeans": F. Jennings, The Invasion
ofAmerica: Indians,Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1975) at 39.
9 Due to the unique quality of treaties, agreements, and alliances between the Crown and First
Nations, which are built upon or stem from the special, suigeneris relationship between the parties,
the obligations assumed thereunder by the Crown are fiduciary in nature.
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and government initiatives such as the Indian Act.10
Within the realm of the Crown's general duty, the Guerin case
did not address these characteristics. Although the Court made strong
statements about the fiduciary nature of the Crown-Native relationship
in general and detailed some of the reasons why that relationship is
fiduciary, Guerin neglected to answer a number of fundamental
questions, which are necessary precursors to a proper understanding of
the Crown-First Nations general fiduciary relationship. Within this
larger context, the most notable defect of the Guerin decision was its
failure to answer the question of who owed fiduciary obligations to First
Nations.
The Guerin case is not the only case to avoid discussing who is
responsible for discharging the fiduciary obligations owed to First
Nations. In the majority of post-Guerin decisions, judicial attention to
fulfilment of the fiduciary duties owed to First Nations has been directed
to the Crown. However, these decisions have not addressed the issue of
which emanations of the Crown-the Crown in right of Canada, the
Crown in right of a province, or both-possess fiduciary obligations to
First Nations.
It is insufficient to state, as the Supreme Court of Canada did in
breached its fiduciary obligations to the
BearIsland,11 that "the Crown ...

Indians" 12 without revealing which personifications of the Crown are
bound by those obligations. In a juridical context, the phrase "the
Crown" has a multitude of meanings that refer to a variety of personae.
It may refer to the historic constitutional notion of a single and
indivisible Crown, to a British Crown in its various personalities, or,

10

Supra note 3. See, for example, Mitchell v. PeguisIndian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 108-09
[hereinafter Mitchell], where Dickson CJ.C. stated that the IndianAct represented "a confirmation
of the Crown's historic responsibility for the welfare and interests" of First Nations; Roberts v.
Canada,supra note 7 at 337, in which the IndianAct was held to codify some of the Crown's preexisting duties towards Native peoples; Guerin,supra note 1 at 383, where Dickson L,as he then
was, stated that the Indian Act confirms the "historic responsibility which the Crown has
undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect their interests in transactions with third
parties." Note also Wilson J.'s emphasis on the historic nature of the Crown's duty, in Guerin, ibid.
at 349, where she stated that "it is the acknowledgment of a historic reality, namely that Indian
Bands have a beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility to protect
that interest." For a more detailed discussion of the sources of specific Crown fiduciary duties to
First Nations, see I.Rotman, Historic Principles,ContemporaryEffects: FiduciaryDoctrine and the
Crown-Native Relationshipin Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
11
12

Supra note 7.
Ibid. at 575.
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domestically, to a federal Crown, or a particular provincial Crown.13
What is required, then, is a direct examination of the various elements of
the Crown that may be bound by fiduciary duties to First Nations; in
particular, the Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of a
14
province.
II. JURIDICAL TREATMENT OF CROWN OBLIGATIONS TO
FIRST NATIONS
A. Overview
While the judicial recognition and sanction of the Canadian
Crown's fiduciary obligations to First Nations are a relatively recent
occurrence, great insight into ascertaining which emanations of the
Crown are responsible for fulfilling those obligations may be derived
from some landmark decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, including St. Catherine'sMilling and Lumber Co. v. Canada
(A.G.);is Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.): Re Indian Claims;16 Ontario
Mining Company Lid. v. Seybold;17 and Dominion of Canada v. Province
of Ontario.18 In these cases, the courts were faced with determining
which levels of government were responsible for discharging treaty
obligations owed to First Nations.

13 The significance of the various meanings associated with "the Crown" and the difficulties
that have resulted from their indiscriminate use has been noted by a number of commentators. For
a more detailed discussion of these distinctions, see J.T. Juricek Jr., English TerritorialClaims in
North America to 1660 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1970) [unpublished]; and the
commentary upon it in G.S. Lester, The TerritorialRights of the Inuit of the Northwest Territories
(DJur. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1981) [unpublished].
14 The notion that the British Crown may have continuing fiduciary obligations to First
Nations is discussed in Rotman, supra note 10. See also text accompanying note 22.
15 Supra note 6.
16 (1896), [1897] A.C. 199 (P.C.) [hereinafterRobinson TreatiesAnnuities, PC], aff'g (1985),
[1896] 25 S.C.R. 434 [hereinafter Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCCJ.
17 (1902), [1903] A.C. 73 (P.C.) [hereinafter Seybol4 PC], affg (1901), 32 S.C.R. 1 [hereinafter
Seybold, SCC], (1900), [19011 32 O.R. 301 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Seybold, Div. Ct.], (1899), and
[1900] 31 O.R. 386 (Ch.) [hereinafter Seybold Ch. ].
18 [1910] A.C. 637 (P.C.) [hereinafter Treaty #3 Annuities, PC], aff'g (sub nom. Province of
Ontario v. Dominion of Canada) (1909), 42 S.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Treaty #3 Annuities, SCC], rev'g
(sub nom. Dominion of Canada v. Provinceof Ontario) (1907), 10 Ex. C.R. 445 [hereinafter Treaty
#3Annuiies, Ex Ct.].
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It is important, when considering the judicial determinations
made in each of these cases, to be aware of the context within which they
were decided, as well as the underlying assumptions of the nature of the
Crown-Native relationship upon which they were predicated. When the
decisions were made, the Crown-Indian relationship was considered akin
to that of guardian and ward, albeit without any resultant legal
obligations attaching to the Crown.1 9 Moreover, the First Nations were
not represented in any of them. Indeed, these cases are determinative
only of the rights and obligations of the federal and provincial Crowns,
vis-ii-vis each other, in discharging the obligations owed to Aboriginal
peoples under the terms of Indian treaties. They do not define the
reciprocal rights and obligations of either the federal or provincial
Crowns in relation to the Aboriginal peoples.
By virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians," under section 91(24) of the British North
America Act, 1867,20 the federal Crown was empowered to enter into
treaty negotiations with Aboriginal groups across Canada. These
negotiations resulted in the formation of numerous treaties, which
entailed various obligations to the Native peoples. As a result of the
nature of the Crown-Native relationship within which they originated,
the obligations owed under these post-Confederation treaties-along
with the Crown's pre-existing obligations stemming from preConfederation treaties, and other events and occurrences such as the
Royal Proclamation,176321-are all part of the modem Crown fiduciary
obligations. 22
Both pre- and post-Confederation treaties are independent roots
of the modem fiduciary obligations. They create specific duties, but do
not create the basis of the Crown's general fiduciary obligations, which
date back to the period after contact. Due to the factual changes in the
Crown's identity and the devolution of legislative and executive
responsibilities for Canada to the newly-created federal and provincial
Crowns in 1867, distinctions must be made between Crown fiduciary
duties predating Confederation and those arising after Confederation.
In circumstances in which a First Nation is a signatory to a treaty with
19

Seesupranote 6 and accompanying text.

20 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 (renamed the
ConstitutionAc4 1867) [hereinafter British North AmericaAct]. Since a number of the cases cited
herein predate the name change of the Act, the Act will be referred to by its original name to avoid
confusion.
21
RS.C. 1985, App. H, No. 1.
22

See Rotman, supra note 10.
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the Crown, the Crown owes that First Nation both general fiduciary
duties, which predate Confederation, and more specific fiduciary
obligations, which arise from the particular circumstances of the treaty,
whether the treaty is pre- or post-Confederation.
The distinction between pre- and post-Confederation fiduciary
duties may differentially affect the satisfaction of those duties by the
Crown. For example, whether an obligation may be characterized as
pre- or post-Confederation is relevant in determining the British
Crown's liability. The British Crown would primafacie be liable for all
pre-Confederation duties to First Nations. It may not be liable for all
post-Confederation fiduciary obligations, or, due to the gradual
devolution of powers to the Canadian Crown and the resultant lessening
of its residual sovereignty over Canadian affairs, it may only be liable in
part.23 The liability of the Canadian Crown is also affected by the preor post-Confederation nature of a fiduciary obligation. This is due to
the British North America Act, 1867 and the assumption of preConfederation liabilities under it by the Dominion of Canada by way of
sections 111, 112, 114, and 115.24
While the Crown's treaty obligations to the Aboriginal peoples
were well known in the nineteenth century-even if their fiduciary
nature was not-the emanations of the Crown responsible for meeting
them were relatively unknown. Over time, as the role of the British
Crown diminished in response to the establishment of a stronger
governmental presence in Canada, 25 it remained to be determined which
personifications of the Crown in Canada were responsible for fulfilling
these outstanding obligations. The judicial process of answering this
question was initiated in the landmark case of St. Catherine'sMilling.26
B. St. Catherine'sMilling
The precedent established in St. Catherine'sMilling27 has had farreaching consequences that remain to this day. The decision drastically

23 See Rotman, ibidL
24
This issue is dealt with in greater detail in the treatment of the Robinson TreadesAnnuitles
case in Part ILC.1, below.
25
For a concise discussion of the devolution of the Crown's duties to the Canadian Crown, see
B. Slattery, "The Independence of Canada" (1983) 5 Supreme Court LR. 369, especially at 390-92.
26
Supra note 6.
271bid.
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and forever altered the effect of Indian land surrender treaties 28
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Noteworthy for
its characterization of the Indian interest in land as a "personal and
usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign," 29
the decision was also the first major pronouncement on the effect of the
constitutional division of federal and provincial powers upon the
surrender of lands obtained through Indian treaties.
The St. Catherine's Milling decision created a lingering and
problematic legacy by juxtaposing the federal Crown's acquisition of
Aboriginal lands and "extinguishment" of Aboriginal title by way of
treaty to the provincial Crown's acquisition of a beneficial interest in the
land once it had been disencumbered of the Aboriginal interest. This
element of the case is particularly relevant to the examination of which
emanation(s) of the Canadian Crown may be found responsible for
discharging the fiduciary obligations owed to First Nations.
The St. Catherine'sMilling decision centred around a dispute
between the province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada over the
ownership of former Indian lands. The lands had been surrendered
under Treaty #3, a post-Confederation treaty signed in 1873, by the
Saulteaux Indians. The St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company
had obtained a license from the Dominion Crown to cut timber on some
of the lands that had been surrendered. The Ontario Crown sought to
restrain the lumber company from cutting timber on those lands by
claiming that it owned a beneficial interest due to section 109 of the
British North AmericaAct, 1867.30 The main issue at bar was which body
28

Whether such treaties actually involved the surrenderof land is a disputed matter, as is the
accuracy of the written account of treaties representing the nature of the bargains actually entered
into between the Crown and Aboriginal groups. See, for example, L. Little Bear, "Aboriginal
Rights and the Canadian 'Grundnorm," in J.R. Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: CanadianIndians

andDecolonization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986) 243; W.E. Daugherty, Treaty Research
Report: Treaty #3 (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada, 1986) at 64; R. Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Edmonton: Pica Pica
Press, 1987); R. Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1973).

29 See St Catherine'sMillin& P.C., supra note 6 at 54. Although the St. Catherine'sMilling
decision has sparked significant discussion and debate over its characterization of Aboriginal title, it
is examined here solely for its relevance to the determination of who is bound by fiduciary duties to

the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.
30
Section 109 reads:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such

Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario,
Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject
to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the

Province in the same.
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of the Crown possessed the beneficial interest in the surrendered
lands-the federal Crown through the operation of section 91(24) of the
British North America Act, 1867,31 or the Ontario Crown by way of
section 109 of theAct.
Considering these sections, the Privy Council found that the
federal Crown's section 91(24) power to enter into treaties and obtain
surrenders of Indian lands did not give it any interest in the land once its
Aboriginal title was extinguished. This conclusion was based upon their
construction of section 109 and their understanding of that section's
effects in the earlier case of Ontario (A.G.) v. Mercer.3 2
In Mercer, the Privy Council had determined that the legal effect
of section 109 was to exclude all ordinary territorial revenues of the
Crown arising within the provinces from the duties and revenues
appropriated to the Dominion. Section 109 effectively vested the
Crown's underlying title to the unsurrendered Indian lands, which were
still subject to Aboriginal title, in the province in which the lands were
located. Once those lands were relieved of any Aboriginal interest, the
full beneficial interest in those lands became vested in the province.33
The Privy Council's finding in St. Catherine'sMilling, that "the
Crown has all along had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon
which the Indian title was a mere burden,"3 4 created a difficult situation.
It separated the power to enter into treaties and the power to fulfil the
terms of those treaties once they had been concluded. The lasting effect
of the decision is to rest exclusive power to obtain a surrender of Indian
lands and to create reserves35 in the federal Crown, and, once a
31

Section 91(24) reads: "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians."

32 (1883), 8 A.C. 767 (P.C.) [hereinafter Mercer].
33

St Catherine'sMillin& PC; supra note 6 at 57. Lands that were obtained by the Dominion
Crown under section 108 or 117 of the British NorthAmericaAcq 1867 are excluded, of course. See
Slattery, supranote 3 at 750-51.
34

St. Catherine'sMillin& PC, ibid. at 58. This determination was made by the Privy Council in
light of its earlier determination, at 54, that the "the tenure of the Indians was a personal and
usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign." However, the appropriateness
of these findings is not universally accepted. See, for example, J.D. Hurley, "The Crown's Fiduciary
Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. the Queen" (1985) 30 McGill L. 559; and K. McNeil, Common
LawAboriginal 7ale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). For further discussion of the characterization
of the Aboriginal interest in land as usufructuary, see W.B. Henderson, "Canada's Indian Reserves:
The Usufruct in Our Constitution" (1980) 12 Ottawa L Rev. 167.
35

This assertion is based upon a straightforward interpretation of the exclusive power vested
in the federal Crown over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" in section 91(24) of the
British NorthAmericaAc4 1867 and, more specifically, the power relating to "Indians," which exists
independently of the power over "Lands reserved for the Indians" as determined by the Supreme
Court of Canada in FourB ManufacturingLtd. v. United Garment Workers ofAmerica (1979), [1980]
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surrender is obtained, to rest exclusive proprietary and administrative
6
rights over the surrendered lands in the provincial Crown.
The practical result of this division of powers is that although
only the federal Crown may create a reserve, it cannot use provincial
Crown lands (such as those obtained from First Nations by surrender
under treaty) for that purpose without the cooperation of the province.
Consequently, when a treaty provides for the creation of a reserve from
lands surrendered under the treaty, the reserve may only be established
through the joint effort of the federal and relevant provincial Crowns.
In addition to the implications flowing from the Privy Council's
decision, judicial recognition of provincial obligations, with respect to
lands surrendered by treaty, may be seen at each stage of St. Catherine's
Milling. At trial, Chancellor Boyd implied that Ontario was bound by
the Dominion Crown's obligations under Treaty #3 because it had
received the benefit of the surrendered lands. As he explained in his
judgment, "[i]t would seem unreasonable that the Dominion
Government should be burdened with large annual payments to the
tribes without having a sufficiency of land to answer, presently or
prospectively, the expenditure." 37 Chancellor Boyd refused to rule upon
the extent of Ontario's responsibilities to the treaty signatories since it
was not made an issue at trial. 38 His statement nevertheless indicates
that Ontario, as beneficiary of the surrender of land under the treaty,
must also be held responsible for discharging the Crown's obligations
under the treaty.
1 S.C.R. 1031 at 1048-50. While a province possesses exclusive power over lands surrendered under
treaty by way of section 109, any attempt by a province to set aside an Indian reserve out of those
lands would clearly infringe upon the exclusive federal power over Indians-which entails the sole
ability to act and legislate in respect of matters that affects Indians qua Indians-and, therefore,
would be ultra virs. See the discussion of the effects of section 88 of the Indian Act on the
applicability of provincial legislation to Aboriginal peoples in Part V, below.
36 The Privy Council determined that the British Legislature did not intend to deprive a
province of its rights under section 109 of the British North America Act, 1867 by conferring
legislative powers over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," to the Dominion Crown
under section 91(24) of the Act- St. Catherine'sMilling, PCsupranote 6 at 59. Indeed, Lord Watson
found, at 59, that having the beneficial interest in land accrue to the Crown in right of the province
in which the land was located upon its surrender was not incompatible with having legislative
control over the same land prior to the surrender reside with the Dominion Crown:
The fact that the power of legislating for Indians, and for lands which are reserved to
their use, has been entrusted to the Parliament of the Dominion is not in the least degree
inconsistent with the right of the Provinces to a beneficial interest in these lands,
available to them as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is
disencumbered of the Indian title.
37

St. Catherine'sMilling, Ch., supra note 6 at 235.

38 "Whatever equities ...
may exist between the two Governments in regard to the
consideration given and to be given to the tribes ...
is a matter not agitated on this record": ibid.
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On appeal, Hagarty C.J.O. argued that it would be natural to
suppose that the federal and provincial Crowns would have arranged for
an equitable distribution of the Treaty #3 obligations had the
boundaries of Ontario and Manitoba been defined at the time the treaty
was signed.3 9 He also suggested that the federal and Ontario Crowns
should share the financial responsibility to the Indians under the terms
of the treaty.40 Patterson J.A., meanwhile, refused to comment upon the
distribution of treaty responsibilities between the Dominion and Ontario
for the same reasons specified by Chancellor Boyd at trial:
[Me see that certain outlay was incurred and certain burdens assumed by the
Government. ... Whether they give rise to any claims or equities between the Dominion
and the Province is a matter of policy as to which we have no information, and with which
we are not concerned beyond the one question of the effect on the right to the timber. 41

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada did not discuss
who was to bear the responsibilities under the treaty. The dissenting
judgment of Strong J., as he then was, however, furthered the earlier
reasoning of Chancellor Boyd and Hagarty C.J.O. in explicitly holding
that the Dominion and Ontario governments were jointly and severally
responsible for carrying out the terms of the treaty:
[A]II the obligations of the crown towards the Indians incidental to their unsurrendered
lands, and the right to acquire such lands and to make compensation therefor[e] by
providing subsidies and annuities for the Indians, attach to and may be performed by the
42
Provinces as well as by the Dominion.

Gwynne J., who also dissented from the majority decision, held
that both the beneficial interest in the surrendered lands, and the
responsibility for fulfilling the Treaty #3 obligations belonged to the
federal Crown. The basis for his finding was that the body that obtained
the benefits of the surrender was liable for discharging the treaty
obligations that had given rise to those benefits. 43 The rationale behind
Gwynne J.'s conclusion, therefore, although leading him to a different
result, is nevertheless consistent with those underlying the judgments of
Strong J., Hagarty C.J.O., and Chancellor Boyd.

39

St. Catheine'sMiling, OCA, supranote 6 at 157.
40 This is evidenced by his statement that the distribution of the financial responsibilities
under the treaty "could, I presume, be carried out in good faith by arrangement between the two
Governments": ibid. at 158.
41
42
43

1bid. at 173.
SL Catherine'sMdling, SCC,supra note 6 at 622.
Ibid at 674-76.
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In delivering the judgment in St. Catherine'sMilling on behalf of
the Privy Council, Lord Watson was explicit about Ontario's
responsibilities to the treaty signatories. He held that the province was
entirely responsible for discharging the annuity obligations incurred
under the terms of the treaty:
Seeing that the benefit of the surrender accrues to her, Ontario must, of course, relieve
the Crown, and the Dominion, of all obligations involving the payment of money which

were undertaken by Her Majesty, and which are said to have been in part fulfilled by the
Dominion Government. 4 4

The results of the considerations of provincial responsibilities at
the various stages of St. Catherine'sMilling may consequently be seen to
suggest the existence of concurrent federal and provincial fiduciary
obligations to Aboriginal peoples, at least within the context of Treaty
#3.
C. Robinson TreatiesAnnuities, Seybold, and Treaty #3 Annuities
A trilogy of cases, Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,45 Seybold,46 and
Treaty #3 Annuities,4 7 continued the discussion of joint federalprovincial responsibilities for the Crown's treaty obligations to First
Nations that had been started in St. Catherine'sMilling.48 They each
referred to Lord Watson's finding of provincial duties in St. Catherine's
Milling. Ultimately, however, they each dismissed any legal basis that
would oblige provinces to assume or offset the responsibilities incurred
by the federal Crown in its negotiation of Indian treaties.
The judgments in these cases reveal that, in arriving at their
respective conclusions, the judges either failed to recognize the equitable
basis of the provincial duty, as illustrated by Lord Watson in St.
Catherine's Milling, or mischaracterized that basis. Upon closer
examination, all three cases may be seen to be consistent with the
indications of provincial fiduciary obligations made in the St. Catherine's
Milling decision.

44

SL Catherine'sMilling PC, supra note 6 at 60.

45

Supra note 16.
Supra note 17.

46
47

Supra note 18.

48 Supra note 6.
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1. Robinson TreatiesAnnuities
In the Robinson TreatiesAnnuities4 9 case, the Supreme Court of
Canada heard an appeal from an arbitration award of 13 February 1895.
The arbitration50 had been authorized to settle the long-standing issue of
who was responsible for paying the increase in annuity payments under
the terms of the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties of
1850: the Dominion of Canada, as the successor of the old province of
Canada, 51 which had negotiated the treaties, the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec which, after Confederation, had reaped the benefits of the
lands surrendered under the treaties, or all three.
Both treaties included provisions that guaranteed the Aboriginal
signatories a particular sum for a perpetual annuity. An identical clause
in each treaty provided for the payment of increased annuities if the
revenues from the surrendered lands rose sufficiently to allow for the
payment of increased annuities to the signatories without resulting in a
loss:
The said William Benjamin Robinson on behalf of Her Majesty, who desires to deal
liberally and justly with all her subjects, further promises and agrees that should all the
territory hereby ceded by the parties of the second part, at any future period produce
such an amount as will enable the Government of this province, without incurring loss, to
increase the annuity hereby secured to them, then, and in that case, the same shall be
augmented from time to time, provided that the amount paid to each individual shall not
exceed the sum of one pound provincial currency in any one year, or such further sum as
Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order.52

The arbitrators held that Ontario alone was responsible for
paying the increase in the adfnuities since the lands surrendered under
the treaties accrued to it.53 Quebec was absolved of liability since the
treaty lands were located within Ontario's boundaries. Ontario appealed
the arbitrators' award to the Supreme Court of Canada. It maintained
that since the former province of Canada had negotiated the treaties, the
federal Crown was solely responsible for discharging any additional
49

Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCC, supra note 16.
The arbitration had been established under section 142 of the British North America Act,
1867 to determine the "Division and Adjustment of the Debts, Credits, Liabilities, Properties, and
Assets" of Upper and Lower Canada.
51 The Dominion was created out of the old Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada by theAct
of Union, 1840 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, reprinted as The Union Act, 1840 in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No.3.
52
Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCC, supra note 16 at 495.
50

53 The accrual occurred by virtue of section 109 of the British North AmericaAc4 1867.
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debts arising from them. Moreover, it claimed that the obligations for
the annuity payments, both the original and any increased amounts, were
subsumed under section 111 of the British NorthAmerica Ac4 1867.5
The Supreme Court of Canada, with Gwynne and King JJ.
dissenting, overturned the arbitrators' award. The majority held that
Ontario was liable only for its portion of any increase in the obligations
owed under the treaty by the former province of Canada, as it had
existed prior to Confederation. Ontario's share of the increase in the
annuities was determined to be in proportion to the amount of the
surrendered lands situated within its post-Confederation boundaries.
The Court's decision did not, however, entail provincial responsibility in
the manner described in the arbitrators' report.
Instead, the duty imposed upon Ontario and Quebec was
premised entirely on the fact that the cap placed upon the Dominion of
Canada's assumption of the pre-Confederation debt of the province of
Canada existing at Confederation, under section 111 of the BritishNorth
America Act, 1867, had already been surpassed. Under section 112 of
the Act, the Dominion's assumption of these pre-Confederation debts
was given a limit. 55 Once the outer margin had been reached, the
Dominion was still obligated to pay the entire debt, but was to be
indemnified by Ontario and Quebec for any amount exceeding that
point.56 Contrary to the arbitrators' determination, therefore, the
Supreme Court's ruling against the provinces was not based upon the
provinces' role as successors to the liability belonging to the province of
Canada. Strong C.J.C. determined that any increase in the annuity
obligations to the Indians, which initially belonged to the province of
Canada, was not transferred in whole or in part to Ontario and Quebec
upon Confederation, notwithstanding section 109. Rather, he held that
the annuities, both the original and any increased amount, were part of
the general debts and liabilities of the former province of Canada and,
therefore, became the responsibility of the Dominion upon
Confederation under section 111:
That it was a "liability" though consisting of deferred periodical payments cannot be
doubted, and that it was a "debt" though not payable in present is also clear;, it therefore

54 The terms of section 111 provided that, upon Confederation, the Dominion of Canada
would absorb and become liable for "the Debts and Liabilities of each Province existing at the
Union," subject to the limits on that amount imposed by sections 112,114, and 115 of the Act. It
was, in essence, a constitutional guarantee that pre-Confederation provincial debts would be paid.
55

The amount of the debt was initially limited to $62,500,000, but was later increased.
56 The provinces were also obligated to pay interest on that amount at the rate of five per cent
per annum.
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comes within the literal meaning of the 111th section, and we are not at liberty to unravel
the arrangements between the two divisions of the old province, upon which it may be
assumed the provisions of the Union Act as to the apportionment of assets and liabilities
was based in order to arrive at some secondary meaning contrary to the ordinary and
natural import of the language of the Act. 5 7

Strong C.J.C. based his conclusion largely upon the arbitrators'
pronouncement. At paragraph XIII of their report, they had
determined:
That all the lands in either of the said provinces of Ontario and Quebec respectively,
surrendered by the Indians in consideration of annuities to them granted, which said
annuities are included in the debt of the late province of Canada, shall be the absolute
property of the province in which the said lands are respectively situate, free from any
further claim upon, or charge to the said province in which they are so situate by the
other of the said provinces.58

Strong C.J.C. relied upon this passage to hold that the increased
annuities were a part of the province of Canada's debt existing at
Confederation. He also used it to refute the argument that the annuity
payments constituted a charge on the lands and were thereby an
"[i]nterest other than that of the Province" under section 109. It should
be noted, though, that the arbitrators' report did not mention the
increased annuities under the Robinson treaties being included within
the debt of the province of Canada.
Strong C.J.C. contended that it was of no consequence to his
findings that, at the time the arbitrators' award was made, the question
of who was responsible for paying the increased annuities had yet to be
posed.59 He then attempted to fabricate a concordance between his
judgment and the arbitrators' report by stating that, since the arbitrators'
award had not been challenged for twenty-five years and may have
formed the crux of other dispositions, "the arbitrators must therefore be
taken to have had in mind all the annuities, the original fixed annuities
as well as those contingently provided for."'6 In point of fact, there is no
support for this conclusion in the arbitrators' report. 61

57
58
59
60

Robinson TreatiesAnnuies, SCC, supranote 16 at 506.
Reproduced in Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCC, ibid. at 440.
ibid. at 507.

bid. at 507-08.
61 See the discussion of King J.'s interpretation of paragraph XIII in relation to this issue in
text accompanying note 65, below. In fact, Strong CJ.C.'s attempt to rationalize his conclusion with
the arbitrators' report reads matters into the report that were neither contained within it nor
contemplated at that time.
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Interestingly enough, in determining that the original annuity
payments were part of the general debts and liabilities of the former
province of Canada-and, therefore, the responsibility of the Dominion
Crown by way of section 111-and that the increase in the annuity
payments was owed by each of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec in
proportions that reflected their respective positions within the former
boundaries of the province of -Canada, Strong C.J.C.'s conclusions
precisely follow the logic employed by Lord Watson in St. Catherine's
Milling. Save for section 11's mandated transfer of provincial debts
existing at Confederation to the Dominion, the provinces of Ontario and
Quebec, as successors to the old province of Canada, would have been
responsible for paying the original annuity money.
Strong C.J.C. deviated from this rationale in his discussion of the
increased annuities. He held that the increase in the annuities was also
part of the general debts and liabilities of the former province of Canada
existing at Confederation; therefore, it too was subsumed under section
111. A closer examination of the premise upon which the increased
annuities were to be awarded demonstrates that Strong C.J.C.'s finding
is inconsistent with the proper construction of the British North America
Act, 1867 and the Robinson treaties.
The Robinson treaties clearly show an intention to provide for
two separate annuities. The first annuity-the original amount-was
payable on the signing of the treaty by the Aboriginal signatories, in a
guaranteed sum. The second annuity-the increase-was potentially
payable, depending on the revenues generated from the surrendered
lands. The first annuity was guaranteed and ascertainable, thereby
enabling it to be properly included under section 111 of the British North
America Act, 1867. The second annuity, meanwhile, was entirely
contingent upon future events, which may never have come to fruition,
and it therefore may never have existed. This uncertainty of the second
annuity rendered its classification by Strong C.J.C., under section 111, as
a debt or liability existing at Confederation completely inappropriate.
Strong C.J.C.'s inclusion of the second annuity under section 111
imparted to it a far wider scope than that envisaged by a literal
interpretation of either the Robinson treaties or section 111. The very
nature of the basis of the increased annuity made it impossible to
determine, other than from year to year, whether it was due and owing.
Based upon the plain construction of section 111 of the British North
America Act, 1867,moreover, it is difficult to sustain an argument that a
future, contingent, and unascertainable liability may be characterized as
"existing at the Union" and, consequently, transferrable to the
Dominion. At best, Strong C.J.C.'s argument that the increased

OSGOODE HALL LAW JQURNAL

[VOL 32 No. 4

annuities fell under section 111 may only sustain the proposition that an
increased annuity was due and owing to the Aboriginal signatories in
1867 for thatparticularyear, which ought to be included under the rubric
of section 111.
The other judgments in the case did not adhere to the same
foundation as Strong C.J.C.'s judgment. Sedgewick J.'s judgment
affirmed Strong C.J.C.'s conclusions. Ai important aspect of Sedgewick
J.'s decision, however, which was not reflected in that of Strong C.J.C.,
was his recognition of the equities of the matter before the court:
[Tihere is the principle expressed in the maxim qui sentit commodwn sentire debit et onus.
If a person accept anything which he knows to be subject to a duty or charge it is rational
and the law may
to conclude that he means to take such duty or charge upon himself, 62
very well imply a promise to perform what he has so taken upon himself.

Sedgewick J. acknowledged that the provinces, by acquiring the benefits
of the surrendered Indian lands obtained through the treaties upon
Confederation while in full knowledge of the Dominion's outstanding
obligationsunder those treaties,which it had assumed from the province
of Canada, must, in principle, assume responsibility for the payment of
the annuities. The provinces were only absolved of their liability for the
original annuity payments due to the operation of section 111.
Gwynne J., dissenting, placed the responsibility for making the
increased annuity payments squarely upon Ontario. He viewed the
annuities as a charge upon the lands, which flowed to the province
through the operation of section 109. In this regard, he disagreed with
the findings in paragraph XIII of the 1870 arbitration, but sided with its
ultimate recommendations:
And as by the 109th section of the British North America Act the province has become
entitled to that fund [from which treaty obligations had been paid prior to 1867], Her
Majesty's government of that province must take the same subject to the trust obligation
in the interest of the Indians assumed by Her Majesty by the stipulations of the treaties.
Her Majesty's government of the province of Ontario must in all reason and justice take
the property mentioned in the section subject to the same obligation as to the payment of
augmentation of the annuities ...
as the late province of Canada would have held them if
no union had taken place. This was the unanimous judgment of the arbitrators upon this
point. That judgment is not at variance with any principle of law, or any statutory
provision; on the contrary it is in perfect accordance with the plainest principles of justice
and is not open to any sound legal objection. 63

King J.concurred in Gwynne J.'s dissent. He insisted that
"Ontario, getting the lands subject to the trust, would have to discharge
62

Robinson TreatiesAnnuities, SCC, supra note 16 at 533.

63

ibid.at 525.
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the burden which before that was upon the province of Canada, now
represented by the provinces of Ontario and Quebec."64 The trust he
referred to was section 109 of the British North America Act, 1867; the
burden was the responsibility of paying the original and the increased

annuity money, as provided in the Robinson treaties.
King J. also refuted Strong C.J.C.'s position regarding the effect
of paragraph XIII of the 1870 arbitrators' report and the increased
annuity payments under the Robinson treaties:
[Tihe matter of the augmentation of annuities was not raised before the arbitrators, and
if the views herein stated upon the main point are correct, it is apparent that the two
things do not rest entirely upon the same foundations. The finding of the arbitrators that
the claim as to the fixed annuities that was brought before them did not constitute a
charge upon the lands, is therefore not conclusive as to the matters in question here. Par.
13 is to be read in the light of the contention before the arbitrators, and not as an abstract
of
and general denial of all charges, etc., respecting the annuities, but simply as a denial 65
the lands being subject to the alleged charge to which it was then claimed to be subject.

It is interesting to note that, on appeal, the Privy Council made no
reference to the 1870 arbitrators' report. 66
Despite the majority's protestations to the contrary, its
conclusion in the Robinson TreatiesAnnuities case may be seen to accord
with Lord Watson's determination of provincial responsibilities for
discharging treaty obligations in St. Catherine'sMilling.67 The majority's
decision differs from Lord Watson's reasoning only in that section 111 of
the British North America Act, 1867 applied in the Robinson Treaties
Annuities case, but it did not apply in St. Catherine'sMilling, since that
case was concerned with a post-Confederation treaty.
In his judgment, Strong C.J.C. attempted to distinguish Lord
Watson's dictum in St. Catherine'sMilling by illustrating the differences
between the facts in St. Catherine'sMilling and those in the Robinson
Treaties case:
the Privy Council held that
[l]n the case of The St Catherine'sMilling Co. v. The Queen ...
this surrender enured to the benefit of the province of Ontario, and so holding it also
decided that Ontario was bound to pay the consideration for which the Indians ceded
their rights in the lands. I see no analogy between that case and the present. In the case
before us no one doubts that the province of Canada, which acquired the lands, was
originally bound to pay the consideration. In the case before the Privy Council the
question was, as it were, between two departments of the government of the Crown, and

64
65
66
67

TNd. at 548.
AUid at 549-50.
Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,PC, supranote 16.
St Catherine'sMilling PC supra note 6.
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the most obvious principles of justice required that the government which got the lands
should pay for them. 68

Ironically, and in direct opposition to its intended purpose, this passage
clearly demonstrates that Strong C.J.C. affirmed Lord Watson's findings
in St. Catherine'sMilling within the context in which they arose. His
attempt to distinguish on the facts Lord Watson's findings in St.
Catherine'sMilling from the matter before him in Robinson Treaties
Annuities case, therefore, was a pointless endeavour. For all intents and
purposes, the underlying rationale behind the two cases is the same.
Furthermore, both cases would have had similar end results save for the
application of section 111 to Robinson TreatiesAnnuities.
Upon the Dominion Crown's appeal of the matter to the Privy
Council, Lord Watson, not surprisingly, affirmed the Supreme Court's
majority decision. 69 In accordance with his earlier determination in St.
Catherine'sMilling, he held that the province of Canada, and its
successors after 1867, were liable for discharging the annuity obligations
under the Robinson treaties. Due to the operation of section 111 of the
British North America Act, 1867, however, that responsibility was
transferred to the federal Crown. Again, the only difference between his
decision in the Robinson TreatiesAnnuities case and his earlier findings
in St. Catherine'sMilling is that in the former, the operation of section
111 removed the provinces' liability, whereas in the latter, section 111
did not apply, so Ontario retained its liability under Treaty #3.
2. Seybold
The issue of provincial responsibility for treaty obligations arose
again in Seybold.70 One of the issues in Seybold concerned the setting
aside and establishment of Indian reserves under the provisions of
Treaty #3, the same treaty dealt with in St. Catherine'sMilling.71 Out of
68

Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCC, supra note 16 at 505.
Robinson TreatiesAnnuities, PC, supra note 16. He also dismissed the notion that the
annuity obligations were a charge on the lands, as suggested by the dissenting judgments of Gwynne
and King JJ: "Their Lordships have been unable to discover any reasonable grounds for holding
that, by the terms of the treaties, any independent interest of that kind was conferred upon the
Indian communities": ibid at 211.
70
Supra note 17.
69

71

Supra note 6. The matters in dispute in Seybold, ibid, were not restricted to resolving who
was responsible for fulfilling the obligation to set aside reserves under the treaty, but also addressed
other issues such as the ownership of mineral rights. For present purposes, however, discussion of
the case herein will be restricted to the former.
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the lands surrendered under the treaty for the benefit of the treaty
signatories, the federal Crown had set aside reserve lands in 1879. It
later sold the reserve lands, without the consent of the province, after
obtaining their surrender from the Indians. The vital question in
Seybold, for present purposes, was whether the obligation to set aside
reserves under the treaty rightfully belonged to the federal Crown, the
Ontario Crown, or both.
At trial,72 Chancellor Boyd recognized the difficulty created by
the St. Catherine'sMilling decision regarding the establishment of Indian
reserves under treaty. He nevertheless determined that the section
91(24) jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians,"
gave the federal Crown the right to set aside, and exercise legislative and
administrative jurisdiction over, the reserve lands. His ruling directly
conflicted with the St. Catherine'sMilling decision, which had clearly
separated the two functions. 73 However, at the conclusion of his
judgment-and perhaps in recognition of his contradiction of the St.
Catherine'sMilling precedent-Chancellor Boyd concluded that it would
be preferable to have the treaty reserves allocated "with the approval
and co-operation of the Crown in its dual character as represented by
the general and the provincial authorities." 74
On appeal to the divisional court,75 Street J. also recognized the
problems in harmonizing the federal Crown's obligation to establish
Indian reserves under the terms of the treaty and the precedent
established in St. Catherine'sMilling. To reconcile these incongruous
positions, Street J. determined that since only Ontario could set aside
the surrendered lands for use as a reserve, it was obliged to do so:
The surrender was undoubtedly burdened with the obligation imposed by the Treaty to
select and lay aside special portions of the tract covered by it for the special use and
benefit of the Indians. The Provincial Government could not without plain disregard of
justice take advantage of the surrender and refuse to perform the condition attached to
76
it.

A majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed
the federal Crown's appeal without written reasons. 77 However,

72 Seybol Ch., supra note 17.
73

See the discussion of the St Catherine'sMilling decision in Part II.B., above.

74

SeyboI4 Ch., supra note 17 at 398.

75 Seybol4 Div. CL, supra note 17.
76

Tbid at 303-04.

77

SeyboI4 SCL supra note 17.
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Gwynne J., dissenting, insisted that any obligations arising from the
treaty must be assumed by Ontario, since it obtained the benefits from
the surrender:
[Flor the benefit so obtained by the province by the treaty of surrender the province
alone should in justice bear the burthen of the obligations assumed by Her Majesty and
the Dominion to obtain the surrender
of those lands as was held in the St. Catherine's
78
Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen.

The federal Crown appealed the Supreme Court's decision to the Privy
Council. 79
The Privy Council determined that the federal Crown's actions in
setting aside, and later selling, the reserves were ultra vires. In delivering
the Privy Council's judgment, Lord Davey stated that Ontario had a duty
to fulfil the terms of the treaty. That duty, however, did not exist in a
strictly legal sense; rather, it only constituted a moral obligation to
cooperate with the federal Crown in setting aside reserves under the
treaty:
[TIhe Government of the province, taking advantage of the surrender of 1873, came at
least under an honourable engagement to fulfil the terms on the faith of which the
surrender was made, and, therefore, to concur with the Dominion Government in
appropriating certain undefined portions of the surrendered lands as Indian reserves.
The result, however, is that the choice and location of the lands to be so appropriated
could only be effectively made by the joint action of the two Governments 8 [emphasis
added]

Lord Davey's characterization of Ontario's obligations under the
treaty is misleading. As a result of the difficulties created by the
constitutional division of powers in the British North America Act, 1867,
the only way to have ensured that the reserve would be set aside was to
have held Ontario and the federal Crown jointly responsible for
establishing it. This necessitated that Ontario's duty be declared to be
legally binding and not merely an "honourable engagement."
Otherwise, a guarantee of satisfaction of the treaty promises did not
exist, nor did the ability of the Aboriginal signatories to legally enforce
the treaty obligations owed to them.
78

Ib at 13. It should be noted that Gwynne J.determined that the power of the federal
Crown over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," under section 91(24) of the British North
America Act, 1867 was not qualified by section 109 and, therefore, that the precedent in St.
Catherine'sMilng did not govern the matter before him: ibid. at 21-22.
79

Seybol4 PC, supra note 17.
80 Ibid. at 82-83. While Lord Davey's "honourable engagement" did not legally bind the
province, it indicated the Privy Council's recognition of existing provincial obligations,
notwithstanding that he prefaced his statement with "Let it be assumed that...."
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It may be argued that negotiations between Canada and Ontario
could resolve this dilemma. Indeed, negotiations between Canada and
the provinces have resolved problems surrounding the establishment of
Indian reserves under treaty.8 1 If Ontario's responsibility under the
treaty in the Seybold scenario was not legally binding, however, it was not
compelled to reach a settlement with Canada. Indeed, it was not
obligated to engage in negotiations with Canada on the issue at all.
Lord Davey's characterization of the nature of Ontario's duty
had the potential to create further problems if Ontario made
unreasonable demands upon Canada for its cooperation in setting aside
reserve lands, or simply refused to negotiate altogether. Since Ontario
was only under an "honourable engagement" to cooperate with Canada,
it was insulated from legal liability for the non-fulfilment of the treaty.
Similarly, although legally bound to fulfil the terms of the treaty, Canada
could rely upon the constitutional division of powers to protect itself
from liability for not discharging the treaty promises.
As a result, even if the Aboriginal signatories to the treaty
successfully concluded a legal action that affirmed their right to receive
reserves under the treaty, the judiciary would have been unable to
enforce that right. A court could neither compel Canada to unilaterally
fulfil the treaty, since Canada does not possess the jurisdiction on its own
to set aside reserves out of surrendered lands, nor compel Ontario to
cooperate with Canada in the setting aside of the reserves, since Ontario
was not legally bound by any such obligation.
An analogy may be drawn between this scenario and the proper
method of interpreting a statute that explicitly binds either the federal or
a provincial Crown, yet, due to the constitutional division of powers,
implicitly binds both Crowns in order to effect its intentions. When such
a statute would be frustrated or rendered absurd unless it is read to bind
both Crowns, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the statute
must be read to bind both by necessity or logical implication.8 2 This
concept is also consistent with the principles of interpreting treaties and
81 This is evidenced by some of the agreements between the federal and provincial Crowns
regarding Indian lands. See, for example, An Act for the Settlement of Certain QuestionsBetween the
Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting Indian Lands, S.C. 1891, c. 5; The Ontario
BoundariesExtension Act, S.C. 1912, c. 40; The Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, S.C. 1912, c. 45;
and An Act for the settlement of certain questions between the Governments of Canadaand Ontario
respectingIndian Reserve Lands, S.C. 1924, c. 48.
82
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Ministerof Transport), [19921 1 S.C.R. 3 at
50-60;Alberta Government Telephonesv. Canada (C.RTC.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 at 280-81; see also,
Bombay (Provinceop v. Bombay (City oJ), [1947] A.C. 58 (P.C.) at 61; and P.W. Hogg, Liability of
the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 210.
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statutes relating to Indians enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Nowegijick v. R 83 In that case, it was held that courts ought to prefer
Aboriginal understandings of treaties and statutes over competing
notions if there is a discrepancy regarding the proper construction to be
give to a particular phrase or concept.84
3. Treaty #3Annuities
The last case in the trilogy, the Treaty #3 Annuities85 case, is
noteworthy for the Privy Council's attempt to wrap up the discussion of
provincial responsibilities to First Nations. The issue to be determined
in the case was whether the federal or Ontario Crown, or both, were
responsible for the payment of annuity monies to the Aboriginal
signatories to Treaty #3.
In accordance with Lord Watson's
determination in St. Catherine'sMilling, the federal Crown contended
that Ontario was obliged to pay the annuities since it had obtained the
beneficial interest in the lands surrendered under the treaty. Ontario
insisted that the federal Crown was solely responsible for the annuity
payments since it had negotiated the treaty.
Burbidge J. ruled in favour of the federal Crown at trial. He
agreed with Lord Watson's determination in St. Catherine'sMilling 86 that
provinces that reaped the benefits of a treaty were responsible for the
costs incurred. 87 A majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
83 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 [hereinafterNowegijick].
84 "[Treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians": ibid. at 36. "Aboriginal understandings of words and
corresponding legal concepts in Indian treaties are to be preferred over more legalistic and
technical constructions": Mitchell, supra note 10 at 98. This principle of interpretation is consistent
with the contraproferentem rule in contract law, which holds that any ambiguity in a contract or
agreement is to be interpreted against the party that drafted the agreement: see S.M. Waddams,
The Law of Contracts,2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1984) at 345-61.
Earlier cases ascribing to the same interpretive mechanisms as those illustrated in Nowegijlck
include: Worcester v Geogia, 6 Pet. 515 (U.S. 1832) at 582; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1899)
at 4; Robinson TreatiesAnnutie, SCC, supra note 16 at 535; R.v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 at 279;
and Krugerand Manuel v. R. (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 at 109. See also the Report of the Select
Committee on Aborigines, 1837, vol. 1, pt II (Imperial Blue Book, 1837 nr VII. 425, Facsimile
Reprint, C. Struik (Pty) Ltd., Cape Town, 1966) at 80: "[A] ready pretext for complaint will be
found in the ambiguity of the language in which their agreements must be drawn up, and in the
superior sagacity which the European will exercise in framing, in intrepreting, and in evading them."
85
86
87

Supra note 18.
St Catheine'sMidlin& PC,supra note 6.
Treaty #3Annuities, Ex C, supra note 18 at 496-97.
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however, overturned Burbidge J.'s decision. 88 Idington J. determined
that Lord Watson's statements in St. Catherine's Milling regarding
Ontario's liability under the treaty were purely obiter dicta and,
therefore, of no legally binding force or effect. Had Lord Watson's
89
statement been legally binding, Idington J. insisted that the Seybold
case would certainly have explicitly recognized this fact and given effect
to it.90 Curiously, Seybold neither explicitly affirmed nor rejected Lord
Watson's conclusion in St. Catherine'sMilling on this point.
Idington J. also explained that Ontario could not be held
responsible for the obligations arising under Treaty #3 since it did not
have the option of accepting or declining receipt of the beneficial
interest in the surrendered lands. 91 Duff J. agreed with Idington J.,
holding that Ontario would only be liable to pay the annuities under the
treaty if it had taken positive action to derive the benefits it received by
way of section 109.92 Idington and Duff JJ. also dismissed the existence
of any equitable grounds upon which to base Ontario's responsibility to
fulfil the terms of the treaty. 93 In dissent, Davies J., with Girouard J.
concurring, affirmed the trial judgment on two grounds: Lord Watson's
pronouncement in St. Catherine's Milling,94 and Strong C.J.C.'s
affirmation of it in Robinson Treaties Annuities.95 The dissenting
judgment in the Treaty #3 Annuities case is significant, since the disputes
in St. Catherine'sMilling and Treaty #3 Annuities are identical.
When the Treaty #3 Annuities case was appealed to the Privy
Council, Lord Loreburn L.C. held that there was no legal principle upon
which to find Ontario legally responsible for fulfilling the payment of the

88 Treaty #3Annuities, SCC, supra note 18.
89 Seybo14 supra note 17.
90

Treaty #3Annuities, SCC supra note 18 at 114-15.
91 Ibid. at 111. Indeed, Ontario received the beneficial interest in the surrendered lands
through the operation of section 109 of the British NorthAmericaAct 1867, rather than through any
positive actions of its own.
92
Ibid. at 126. He also found that Lord Watson's statements in St. Catherine'sMilling PC,
supra note 6, were purely obiter and of no legally binding effect: ibid. at 130-32.
93

Treaty #3Annuties, SCC, ibid. at 111, Idington L, and Duff L at 25.

94

St. Catherine'sMiLlin& PC; supra note 6.

95

See Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,SCC, supra note 16 and text accompanying that note.
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annuity under the treatyY6 He did not leave the matter entirely without
comment, though:
It may be that, as a matter of fair play between the two Governments, as to which their
Lordships are not called upon to express and do not express any opinion, the province
ought to be liable for some part of this outlay. But in point of law, which97alone is here in
question, the judgments of the Supreme Court appears unexceptionable.

Entirely obiter, Lord Loreburn L.C.'s statement is by no 9means
8
It
conclusive on the issue of provincial legal responsibility.
nevertheless recognizes that, as a result of the circumstances created by
the constitutional division of powers, the province may well hold
obligations to First Nations independent of those owed by the federal
Crown.
D. Summary and Conclusions
This discussion of St. Catherine'sMilling,99 and the subsequent
trilogy of cases, 1°° illustrates the existence of provincial responsibility for
the payment of annuities under pre-Confederation treaties as well as
joint federal-provincial obligations regarding the setting aside of reserves
from lands surrendered under treaty. It also shows the significant
distinction between the obligation to pay annuities under a treaty and
the obligation to set aside Indian reserves from lands surrendered under
it. Since Indian treaties are concrete manifestations of the Crown's
fiduciary obligations to First Nations, 10 1 these cases demonstrate one
basis for the existence of provincial fiduciary duties to First Nations.
The issue of provincial responsibility in these cases may have
been made clearer had the majority of judges rendering decisions not

96 Treaty #3 Annuities, PC, supra note 18 at 645: "In the present case it does not appear to
their Lordships that the claim of the Dominion can be sustained on any principle of law that can be
invoked as applicable."
97

ibld. at 646.

98

]bi. at 647.

99

Supra note 6.
100 Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,supranote 16; Seybold supra note 17; and Treaty #3Annuitles,
supra note 18.
101 See notes 9, 10, and accompanying text.
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been adversely affected by the issue of privity. 0 2 Since the treaties in
question had been negotiated and signed by the federal Crown, the
judges had difficulty finding that the provinces could be held liable for
obligations undertaken by the federal Crown. This reluctance existed
separate and apart from the tangible effect of section 109 of the British
North America Act, 1867 on these situations. In particular, it resulted in
the provinces receiving the benefits derived from the treaties.
The judges' problems with the privity issue are particularly
evident in the Treaty #3 Annuities case, where Lord Loreburn L.C.
stated:
In making this treaty the Dominion Government acted upon the rights conferred by the
Constitution. They were not acting in concert with the Ontario Government, but on their
own responsibility, and it is conceded that the motive was not any special benefit to
Ontario, but a motive of policy in the interests of the Dominion as a whole. 103

Both Idington and Duff JJ. voiced similar concerns in the Supreme
104
Court of Canada's determination of the Treaty #3 Annuities case.
What the judges failed to consider was that, at the time that the
Robinson treaties and Treaty #3 were signed, the constitutional
understanding of the Crown was that it was "one and indivisible"
throughout the Commonwealth. 10 5
When the British North America Act, 1867 created federal and
provincial Crowns in Canada, it did not affect the existing constitutional
understanding of the Crown or the nature and extent of its preConfederation obligations and responsibilities. It merely divided the
powers, responsibilities, and benefits of a single and indivisible Canadian
102 The principle of privity of contract holds that two parties to a contract cannot impose
obligations upon a third party who was not privy to the agreement, subject to certain exceptions.
See S.M. Waddams, supra note 84, especially at 200-04. See also, Dunlop Pneumatic 7yre Co. v.
Selfridge & Co., [1915] A.C. 847 (H.L); Vandepitte v. PreferredAccident Insurance Co, [1933] 1
D.LR. 289 (P.C.); and GreenwoodShopping PlazaLtda v. Beattie, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 228. Note as well
the discussion of privity in relation to the Bear Island decision, supra note 7, in K. McNeil, "The
High Cost of Accepting Benefits From the Crown: A Comment On The Temagami Indian Land
Case" [1992] 1 C.N.LR. 40 at 50-54.
103
Treaty #3Annuities, PC, supra note 18 at 644.
104 See Treaty #3 Annuities, SCC, supra note 18 at 111, 126, and 130-32. See also text
accompanying notes 91 and 92.
105 See, for example, Theodore v. Duncan, [1919] A.C. 696 (P.C.) at 706: "The Crown is one
and indivisible throughout the Empire, and it acts in self-governing states on the initiative and
advice of its own Ministers in these States." See also R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
CommonwealthAffairs, exparteIndianAssociationofAlberta, [1982] 2 All E.R. 118 (CA.) at 127-28,
where Lord Denning M.R. explained that the constitutional understanding of "the Crown" as
"single and indivisible" was changed at the Imperial Conference of 1926 (Cmd 2768) to "separate
and divisible" according to the particular territory in which it was sovereign.
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Crown1 °6 among the newly-created federal and provincial Crowns. This
division included the Crown's pre-existing fiduciary obligations to First
Nations. Therefore, the allocation of powers in the British North
America Act, 1867 did not remove or reduce the Crown's fiduciary
obligations to the First Nations, but simply redistributed them.1 07
The fact that the Canadian Crown remained single and
indivisible prevented it from escaping its obligations to First Nations by
donning a provincial-or federal-Crown "hat" at its convenience.
Moreover, the Crown could not escape liability for adequately
discharging its fiduciary duties by virtue of jurisdictional problems, such
as those surrounding the establishment of Indian reserves from Indian
lands surrendered by treaty:
Each level of government has an independent constitutional role and responsibility.
Both are, however, subject to the demands of the honour of the Crown, and this must
mean, at a minimum, that the aboriginal people to whom the Crown in all its emanations
owes an obligation of protection and development, must not lose the benefit of that
obligation because of federal-provincial jurisdictional uncertainty. 108

Mutual power entails mutual responsibility10 9 and it is this
mutual responsibility, founded in part upon the sharing of legislative and
executive powers by the federal and provincial Crowns, that underlies
the Crown's fiduciary obligations to First Nations. If a provincial Crown
obtains exclusive proprietary and administrative rights over Indian lands
surrendered by treaty, then it must, by necessity or logical implication,
also obtain a portion of the fiduciary duties owed to the Aboriginal
signatories to the treaty 1 0 Section 109 of the BritishNorth America Act,
1867 is the conduit by which this transfer is effectuated. Once this
1 06

The Canadian Crown was, itself, a part of the larger "single and indivisible" Crown in right
of the Commonwealth.
107 See B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can.
Bar Rev. 261 at 274:
The rearrangement of constitutional powers and rights accomplished at Confederation
did not reduce the Crown's overall fiduciary obligations to First Nations. Rather, these
obligations tracked the various powers and rights to their destinations in Ottawa and the
Provincial capitals.
108
A. Pratt, "Federalism in the Era of Aboriginal Self-Government" in D.C. Hawkes, ed.,
Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility: ErploringFederal and ProvincialRoles (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1989) 19 at 53.
109 See W.N. Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning" (1913-14) 23 Yale LJ.16; W.N.Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied
in Judicial Reasoning" (1916-17) 26 Yale L.J. 710; and W.N. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal
ConceptionsAsApplied in JudicialReasoning(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).
110 See the references, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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transfer takes place, the province is legally bound to cooperate with the
federal Crown in fulfilling the terms of the treaty.111 Brian Slattery has
expressed similar sentiments in "First Nations and the Constitution: A
Question of Trust:"
Where the benefiting Province has the exclusive constitutional authority to fulfill the
Crown's promises, it cannot take the benefit of the surrender without incurring
corresponding fiduciary obligations. Thus, if the Federal Crown has undertaken to set
Province to which the
aside reserves out of the lands surrendered, this promise binds the 112
lands pass, because it alone has the power to carry out the promise.

III. RECENT JUDICIAL INFERENCES OF PROVINCIAL
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST NATIONS
In opposition to the judicial determinations in the Robinson
TreatiesAnnuities,113 Seybold,114 and Treaty #3 Annuities115 decisions,
more recent judicial consideration of provincial obligations indicates a
return to the reasoning espoused by Lord Watson in St. Catherine's
Milling.116
A. Smith
In Smith v. R.,117 the federal Crown, on behalf of the Red Bank
Indian Band, sought a declaration for possession of surrendered reserve
lands that had been squatted upon since 1838. In 1895, the band had
surrendered reserve lands to the federal Crown to enable them to be
sold for the band's benefit. 118 At the time the action was commenced,
111

The province is bound to the extent that it is legally or constitutionally able to cooperate.
112 Supra note 107 at 275.
113

Supra note 16.

114

Supra note 17.

115

Supra note 18.

116 Supra note 6.
117 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter Smith].
118

In Canada, Indian interests in land cannot be alienated to anyone other than the Crown.
This restriction exists as a result of British practice originating in the early colonization of North
America. The most noteworthy indication of the Crown's practice of interposing itself as a requisite
intermediary in the sale of Aboriginal lands may be seen in the Royal Proclamation,1763, supranote
21. Note that this practice also existed in other parts of the British Empire: see, for example, R. v.
Symonds, [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (S.C.) at 391. Today, the requirement that surrenders may only be
made to the Crown in right of Canada is entrenched in section 37 of the IndianAct, supra note 3,
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the surrendered lands had not been sold and remained occupied by
squatters.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal Crown
could not maintain the action since it no longer possessed jurisdiction
over the lands after their surrender. The Court did not address the issue
of whether the federal or provincial Crowns, or both, were legally
responsible for discharging the obligations incurred under the terms of
the surrender. It did not, however, leave the issue entirely without
comment.
In determining that the band's release of its interests was
absolute, Estey J. referred to the Seybold119 decision by stating that the
effects of the band's release "might give rise to differences as between
the parties to the release."1 20 He suggested that "if and when such
related, but here extraneous, issues arise, the courts concerned may find
of interest the comment of Street J. in the judgment of the Divisional
Court of Ontario in Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold." 121 The portion of
Street J.'sjudgment quoted by Estey J. reads:
The surrender was undoubtedly burdened with the obligation imposed by the treaty to
select and lay aside special portions of the tract covered by it for the special use and
benefit of the Indians. The Provincial Government could not without plain disregard of
justice take advantage of the surrender and refuse to perform the condition attached to
it.1 2 2

Later, in the context of discussing the effects of the Crown's obligations
to the band under the terms of the surrender, Estey J. commented that
"other consequences could arguably flow from such a transaction," but
that they went beyond the Court's focus upon "the surrender and its
consequences in law in relation to the title to the said lands." 123 While
Estey J. neglected to pursue this line of inquiry,124 the Smith case hints
that a provincial Crown may be found liable for discharging the
and in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Crown in right of Canada over "Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians," in section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867. For further discussion and
analysis of the surrender requirements contained within the Indian Act, see J.P. Salembier, "How
Many Sheep Make a Flock? An Analysis of the Surrender Provisions of the IndianAct" [1992] 1
C.N.LR. 14.
119 Supra note 17.
120

Smith, supra note 117 at 564.
121 Ibid.
12 2 Jbid.at 565. See also Seybold, Div. Ct., supranote 17 and accompanying text.
123

Supra note 117 at 570.

124 Undoubtedly, the neglect was due to his earlier characterization of these issues as
"extraneous" to the matter before the court: ibid. at 564.
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obligations stemming from an Indian land treaty or from a surrender of
Indian reserve lands to the Crown.
B. Gardner
In Gardner v. Ontario (A.G.), 125 the Eagle Lake Band had
commenced an action against the federal and Ontario Crowns for their
roles in excluding certain lands from the band's reserve allotment under
Treaty #3. In particular, the band sought a declaration of their right of
possession of headlands in the parts of their reserves that were bordered
by bodies of water. By agreement with the federal Crown, 126 Ontario
had initially undertaken to protect those interests, but effectively
reneged upon that agreement through its enactment of contrary
12 7
legislation.
Due to legislative requirements at the time the band brought its
suit, to seek redress against both Crowns, the band was forced to bring
concurrent actions in the federal and provincial courts. 128 Ontario
insisted that the actions were identical and could not both be
maintained. To prevent what it viewed as an abuse of process, Ontario
sought to have the Ontario Court strike out the band's statement of
claim against it. Ontario argued that only the band's federal court action
against the federal Crown ought to proceed. The basis of its contention
was that, as a result of the IndianAct, there was a primafacie privity of
contract between the band and the federal Crown.

125 (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 760 (H.CJ) [hereinafter Gardner].
126 An Act for the Settlement of Questions Between the Governments of Canada and Ontario
Respecting IndianLands, S.O. 1891, c. 3; and An Act for the Settlement of Certain QuestionsBetween
the Governments of Canadaand OntarioRespectingIndian Lands,supra note 81.
127

The Beds of Navigable Wateri Act, S.O. 1911, c. 6; andAn Act to Confirm the Title of the
Government of Canadato Certain Lands and Indian Lands, S.O. 1915, c. 12. The latter directly
contravenes the agreement between Ontario and Canada established in the 1891 statutes, ibid. See
also the discussion of the effects of these statutes in Ontarioand Minnesota Power Co. v. The Kng,
[19251 A.C. 196 (P.C.); A. Emerson, Research Report on Policy of the Government of Ontario Re.
Headlandto Headland Question, Treaty #3, 1873-1978 (Toronto: Office of Indian Resource Policy,
Ministry of Natural Resources, 1978); and R.H. Bartlett, Aboriginal Water Rights in Canada
(Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, University of Calgary, 1988) at 103-09.
128 At that time, the Crown in right of Canada could only be sued in the federal courts, while
the Crown in right of Ontario could only be sued in the Ontario courts. Section 17(1) of the Federal
CourtAc4 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 now provides that the Federal Court, Trial Division possesses
"concurrent original jurisdiction in all cases where relief is claimed against the Crown," thereby
allowing both federal and provincial Crowns to be co-defendants in one action in that court.
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White J. determined that the band could continue the actions
concurrently in the federal and Ontario courts. He based his decision on
the following: (1) statutory requirements in existence at the time, (2) his
finding that the band had a justiciable claim against the province, and (3)
his finding that the province, having promised to uphold the band's
interests by agreement with the federal Crown, should have more
concern for the band's loss of rights:
[Tihe plaintiffs have been deprived of a valuable right which, in part, they paid for by
surrendering their aboriginal rights to the Crown in right of Canada. It is unseemly that
the Province of Ontario, which in an agreement with the Dominion of Canada, promised
to uphold that right, is not solicitous of that right. Perhaps, the Province of Ontario
should have viewed any 12
inperfection
in the plaintiffs' pleading with a more appropriate
9
measure of forbearance.

The Gardnercase did not determine Ontario's obligations under
the terms of the treaty. The sole matter in issue was Ontario's
application to strike out the band's statement of claim. Gardner did
recognize, however, that Ontario, by virtue of its actions in accepting and
later repudiating the protection of the band's rights under the treaty,
may possess obligations towards the band based upon its enactment of
legislation protecting Aboriginal interests. 130
C. CreeRegionalAuthorityand Delgamuukw
The notion of provincial fiduciary responsibilities towards First
Nations was raised again in CreeRegionalAuthorityv. Robinson131 and in
the trial judgment in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.132 In the Cree
RegionalAuthority case, the central issue to be judicially determined was
the obligation of the federal administrator of the James Bay and
Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act133 in conducting an
environmental assessment of the Great Whale Hydroelectic Project in
Northern Quebec. In its judgment, the trial division of the Federal
Court implied that provincial Crowns may hold fiduciary obligations
toward Native peoples. It determined that in R. v. Sparrow,13 4 the
129

Gardner,supra note 125 at 775-76.

13 0

See the further discussion on this point in Part V, below.

13 1

Supra note 4.

132 (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafterDelgamuukw, BCSC].
133 S.C. 1976-77, c. 32.
13 4

Supra note 5.
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Supreme Court of Canada's discussion of fiduciary duties did not
distinguish between federal and provincial Crowns. This led the court to
find that "the provincial authorities are also responsible for protecting
the rights of the Native population."135
In the British Columbia Supreme Court's judgment in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
hereditary chiefs had commenced an action seeking a declaration that
they possessed jurisdiction over, and ownership of, their traditional
lands. Alternatively, they maintained that they possessed Aboriginal
rights to use the land. The claim was founded on the occupation, use,
and enjoyment of the land by the plaintiffs, their people, and ancestors
since time immemorial; the terms of the Royal Proclamation,1763; and
the further confirmation of their rights by the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
Although he denied the plaintiffs' claims, McEachern C.J.B.C.,
as he then was, held that the Crown had a fiduciary duty to allow the
plaintiffs to use unoccupied or vacant Crown land for subsistence
purposes until the land was dedicated to another purpose.13 6 Since that
duty could only be enforced against the province through the operation
of section 109 of the British North America Act, 1867, he determined that
the province was also bound by the fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.13 7 On
appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal varied the trial judgment
in Delgamuukw without comment upon this particular issue.13 8
D. BearIsland
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bear Island13 9 is also
noteworthy for its inference of provincial fiduciary responsibility to First
Nations. The pivotal issue was whether or not the Teme-Augama
Anishnabai people adhered to the Robinson-Huron Treaty, 1850, either
expressly or by implication. 140 The Court's decision suggested that
135

Cree RegionalAuthority, supra note 4 at 106.

136 Delgamuukw, BCSC, supra note 132 at 482.
137 ibid. at 536.
138 (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 [hereinafter Delgamuukw, BCCA].
139 Supra note 7.
140 Ibid. This issue is far more complicated than this presentation suggests. For further
elaboration of the issues in Bear Island at the pre-Supreme Court of Canada level, see K. McNeil,
"The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket" in M. Bray & A.
Thomson, eds., Temagami: A Debateon Widderness (Toronto: Dundurn, 1990) 185. Commentary on
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision may be found in McNeil, supra note 102.
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Ontario was bound by fiduciary obligations to the Teme-Augama
Anishnabai derived from the Robinson-Huron Treaty, 1850. While it
vaguely stated that "the Crown ... breached its fiduciary obligations to
the Indians," 41 without determining which emanations of the Crown
held and breached those obligations, it also explained that the matters
involving the breach of duty "currently form the subject of negotiations
between the parties." 142 The Court's statement is particularly intriguing
in light of the fact that the only parties involved in the negotiations
referred to were the Temagami people and the province of Ontario.
The federal Crown was not involved. By virtue of this circumstance-of
which the Court was eminently aware at the time of its decision-the
logical inference to be made is that the Court held Ontario responsible
for the fiduciary obligations owed to the Temagami people.
Indeed, it is difficult to fathom why the province would be
involved in negotiations over the Crown's breach of duty to the
Temagami people in the absence of the federal Crown's participation if
it was not, itself, bound by a fiduciary duty to the Temagami people. Of
more general applicability is the fact that there was nothing unique
about Ontario's role in the Bear Island scenario, which resulted in the
Supreme Court's inference of Ontario's fiduciary obligations to the
Temagami people.
The events in Bear Island (pursuant to which the court found
that the Crown had breached its fiduciary responsibilities) are akin to
other situations in which lands surrendered by Aboriginal peoples under
treaties negotiated by the federal Crown accrue, under section 109 of the
British North America Act, 1867, to the provinces in which the lands are
situated. The conclusions from the discussion of St. Catherine's
Milling143 and the trilogy of decisions 44 regarding federal and provincial
obligations to First Nations suggest that the equitable basis of finding a
provincial fiduciary duty is concerned primarily with whether the
province reaped benefits under the treaty.145 In the Bear Island
scenario, Ontario did reap a benefit by obtaining the beneficial interest
in the Indian land surrendered under the Robinson-Huron Treaty, 1850
and situated within its boundaries.
141Bearsland,supra note 7 at 575.
142 ]bid.
1 43 Supra note 6.
144 Robinson TreatiesAnnuities,supranote 16; Seybold, supra note 17; and Treaty #3 Annuities,
supra note 18.
145
See Part II.C., above.
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Based upon these observations, it cannot be claimed that the
Supreme Court of Canada's conclusions regarding Ontario's fiduciary
duty to the Temagami people ought to be restricted to the situation
arising in Bear Island. The Bear Island decision did not, moreover,
define or limit Ontario's fiduciary obligation. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's inference of provincial fiduciary responsibilities belonging to
Ontario may support the notion of general provincial fiduciary
responsibilities to Aboriginal peoples- living within the provinces'
jurisdictional boundaries.
E. Summary and Conclusions
It is beyond dispute that the relationship between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples in Canada far predates the separation of legislative
and executive powers established in the British North America Act, 1867.
While the bulk of this paper has focused upon positive legal rationales
for the entrenchment of fiduciary obligations upon the federal and
provincial Crowns, there is a far more fundamental, and generally
neglected, rationale for these conclusions-the Aboriginal
understanding of the Crown-Native relationship, as reflected, in part, in
Aboriginal understandings of "the Crown."
IV. ABORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF "THE CROWN"
Traditionally, Aboriginal peoples' reference point for the basis of
the Crown's fiduciary duties to First Nations in Canada has always been
"the Crown." It has not been the Crown in right of Britain, the Crown in
right of Canada, or the Crown in right of a particular province. This
understanding stems from the wording of treaties and of other
agreements between the Crown and Native peoples, as well as the
explanations provided to the First Nations by the Crown's own
representatives. Based upon the accounts of the history and background
to many Indian land treaties, no differentiation between the
personifications of the Crown were made evident to the Native
peoples.1 46 From the First Nations' standpoint, therefore, when the
14 6

See, for example, Price, supra note 28; Fumoleau, supra note 28; J.D. Hurley, Children or
Brethren:AboriginalRights in ColonialIroquoia(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 1985); F. Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984)
[hereinafterAmbiguous IroquoisEmpire]; F. Jennings, Empire of Fortune, (New York- W.W. Norton,
1988) [hereinafter Empire of Fortune]; and A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indiansof
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Crown dealt with Aboriginal peoples and undertook certain
responsibilities towards them, it did so as a unified entity.
Other considerations that have affected the constitutional
understanding of the Crown and its responsibilities to First Nations from
the time of contact-including the British North America Act, 1867's
division of the Canadian Crown into federal and provincial Crowns, and
the change in the constitutional understanding of the Crown from
"single and indivisible" to "separate and divisible" 14 7-were entirely
external to Aboriginal understandings of the Crown. First Nations were
never involved in the effectuation of these changes. Moreover, they
were not consulted about them and their effects upon the Crown-Native
relationship.
Owing to the situation of the First Nations when these changes
were taking place, they cannot be expected to have known or fully
comprehended the intended effect of these changes without having been
informed of them and their effects. In any event, in accordance with the
general principles of fiduciary doctrine, neither were the Aboriginal
peoples responsible for discovering the changes in the understanding of
the Crown nor was the nature and extent of the Crown's fiduciary duty
148
owed to them lessened in any respect by these changes.
The conflict between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
understandings of the Crown is illustrated by the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in Mitchell.1 49 The Manitoba government had rebated
the Peguis Indian Band for monies the band had paid under an invalid
sales tax imposed on the sale of electricity on Indian reserves.
Meanwhile, one of the band's creditors had obtained a garnishing

Manitoba and the North-West Tenitories (Toronto: Willing & Williamson, 1880).
14 7
See description, supra note 105.
148

A fundamental premise of fiduciary doctrine insists that beneficiaries need not inquire into
the actions of their fiduciaries, but may rely entirely upon the latter's honesty, integrity, and fidelity
to their best interests. This notion is discussed in L. Rotman, "Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in
Need of Understanding" [forthcoming]. See also Midcon Oil & Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion
Oil Co., [1958] S.C.R. 314 at 328, per Rand J., dissenting; CarlB. PotterLtd. v. MercantileBank of
Canada,[1980] 2 S.C.R. 343 at 352; and M.V. Ellis, FiduciaryDuties in Canada (Toronto: Do Boo,
1988) at 2-22, where he comments that judicial findings that place an obligation upon beneficiaries
to ensure their fiduciaries' fidelity are "repugnant to the basic duty of utmost good faith owed by the
trustee."
149
Supra note 10. See also the discussion of Mitchell from an administrative law perspective
in H.W. MacLauchlan, "Developmerlts in Administrative Law: The 1989-90 Term" (1991) 2
Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 1 at 13-18.
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order,150 under the Manitoba GarnishmentAct,151 against the rebate. In
accordance with the order, the government paid the garnished amount
into court. The band sought to have the garnishing order set aside and
the monies paid out of court on the basis that the order was inconsistent
with sections 89(1) and 90(1)(b) of the Indian Act.1 52 The band
maintained, moreover, that the Manitoba GarnishmentAct was not a
provincial law applicable to Indians under section 88 of the Indian Act
and, therefore, was not applicable to the matter in issue.153
The broad issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was
whether the monies paid to the band could be considered the personal
property of a band situated on a reserve and thereby not subject to
garnishment under section 89(1) of the IndianAct. For the purposes of
section 89(1), the definition of personal property situated on a reserve
included monies "given to Indians or to a band under treaty or
agreement between a band and Her Majesty" under section 90(1)(b) of
the Act. In order to determine if the rebate came under section
90(1)(b), the Court was faced with determining which emanations of the
Crown were contained within the phrase "Her Majesty," as it was used in
section 90(1)(b).
In principle, all of the members of the Supreme Court of Canada
agreed that the use of the phrase "Her Majesty" in federal legislation
could refer to both federal and provincial Crowns. In the particular
instance of section 90(1)(b), however, La Forest J.'s majority decision
held that "Her Majesty" referred only to the federal Crown. Dickson
C.J.C., dissenting, insisted that the use of "Her Majesty" in section
90(1)(b) referred to both federal and provincial Crowns.
While La Forest J.'s assessment was based upon an adherence to
the intentions of Parliament in enacting the Indian Act, Dickson C.J.C.
concentrated upon Aboriginal understandings of the phrase "Her
Majesty," as mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in

150 A garnishing order is authorized by statute and allows a debtor's money, property, or
receivables, which are in the possession of, under the control of, or owed to a third party, to be
applied in payment of the debtor's indebtedness to one or more creditors.
151
R.S.M. 1970, c. G20.
152

RS.C. 1970, c. 1-6. Under the current Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, these provisions retain the
same numbering as under the previous Act.
153 Section 88 allows for provincial laws of general application to be rendered applicable to
status Indians, as defined in sections 6 to 7 of the current Act, by referential incorporation, except
when they are inconsistent with the terms of Indian treaties, the Indian Act, or other federal
legislation.
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Nowegijick.15 4 Relying upon Nowegijick's determination that "treaties
and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and
doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indian,"155 Dickson C.J.C.
held that the definition of "Her Majesty" in section 90(1)(b) of the
IndianAct ought to concur with Aboriginal interpretations of the phrase,
which he found included both federal and provincial Crowns:
[Tihe Indians' relationship with the Crown or Sovereign has never depended upon the
particular representatives of the Crown involved. From the aboriginal perspective, any
federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed on itself are internal to itself and
do not alter the basic structure of Sovereign-Indian relations.15 6

The basis of Dickson C.J.Cs conclusion may be found in the historic
relationship between the Crown and First Nations in Canada:
That relationship began with pie-confederation contact between historic occupiers of
North American lands (the aboriginal peoples) and the European colonizers (since 1763,
"the Crown"), and it is this relationship between aboriginal peoples and the Crown that
15 7
grounds the distinctive fiduciary obligation on the Crown.

Due to the pre-Confederation origins of the Crown-Native fiduciary
relationship, Dickson C.J.C. held that Aboriginal understandings of
"Her Majesty" or "the Crown" must also be rooted in pre-Confederation
realities1 58 Therefore, although the constitutional division of powers
upon Confederation may have necessitated the creation of the federal
and provincial Crowns in Canada, that change did not affect Aboriginal
understandings of the Crown. Similarly, it did not affect the fulfilment
of the Crown's duty to the First Nations.15 9
Dickson C.J.C.'s adherence to the notion that the provinces
share in the Crown's fiduciary duty to First Nations is reflected in his
comments relating to the divisibility of the Crown vis-a-vis Aboriginal
views of the Crown.1 60 It is reinforced by his statement that it is possible
to "over-emphasize the extent to which aboriginal peoples are affected
only by the decisions and actions of the federal Crown." 161 His
154

See supra note 83.

155 MAtchell supra note 10 at 98. Note also the reference to the problems in the interpretation
of Indian treaties in the Report ofthe Select Committee onAborigines, 1837, supra note 84 at 80.
156
Mitchelg ibid. at 108-09.
1571bid.
158 Ibid.
!59 See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
160

See Mitchel supra note 10 at 108-09.

161 Ibid.
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discussion of the incidental effects doctrine 62 is also suggestive of
provincial fiduciary obligations. Finally, his review of the Guerin 63
decision demonstrates that the findings in that case do not prohibit a
determination that the Crown's fiduciary duty is shared by the
provinces. 164
La Forest J.'s majority judgment in Mitchell explicitly rejected
Dickson C.J.C.'s characterization of Aboriginal understandings of the
Crown as not reflecting modem circumstances:
With deference, I question his conclusion that it is realistic, in this day and age, to
proceed on the assumption that from the aboriginal perspective, any federal-provincial
divisions that the Crown has imposed upon itself are simply internal to itself; such that
the Crown maybe considered what one might style an "indivisible entity." 165

His rationale for not holding that section 90(1)(b) of the IndianAct also
encompassed the provincial Crowns is based upon his assertion that to
include the provinces would grant the First Nations an advantage which
was not justifiable in light of the Crown's historic protection of Indian
lands and property, as codified in sections 87 and 89 of the IndianAct.
Traditionally, only Indian property situated on a reserve was held to be
free from taxation or distraint. 166 The situs, or location, of the property
was, and still is, the determining factor regarding the property's
protection under the IndianAct. Section 90(1)(b) statutorily deems any
personal property that was given to Indians or an Indian band by Her
Majesty as being situated on a reserve and therefore protected. La
Forest J. deemed, however, that the Indian Act's protection of Indian
property was limited to the personal property promised to Indians in
treaties and ancillary agreements by the Crown, in accordance with the

162 This doctrine states that laws in relation to a matter within the competence of one level of
government may validly affect a matter within the competence of a second level: see, for example,
Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television & Telecommunications
Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 at 260.
163
Supra note 1.
16 4

MitcheU, supra note 10 at 209: "On its facts, Guerin only dealt with the obligation of the
federal Crown arising upon surrender of land by Indians" [emphasis in original]. See also the
discussion in Rotman, supra note 10; B. Morse, "Government Obligations, Aboriginal Peoples and
Section 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867" in Hawkes, ed., supra note 108, 59 at 84: "Although
there is no case law on this point, and the Supreme Court in Guerin was only dealing with a claim
against the federal government, the judgments do not imply a limitation of the duty to the Crown in
right of Canada alone."
165
Mitchell ibid. at 144.
166 See sections 87 and 89 of the Indian Act.
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latter's historic undertakings. 1 67 He held that if anything other than a
continuation of the Crown's historic practices was envisaged by sections
87 and 89 of the IndianAct, those sections would have expressly stated
such an intention. 168
La Forest J.'s interpretation of section 90(1)(b) in Mitchell may
be seen to adhere to the frozen rights theory, which states that rights
exist only in the form that they were exercisable in at a certain point in
time, and they are not capable of modification or change. However, this
theory was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Sparrow.1 69 The majority decision in Sparrow, which, ironically, was
delivered jointly by Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J., explained that:
[A]n existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in
which it was regulated before 1982. ... [The phrase "existing aboriginal rights" must be
interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time. ... Clearly, then, an
approach to the constitutional guarantee embodied in s. 35(1) which would incorporate
"frozen rights" must be rejected. 1 70

What is intriguing about La Forest J.'s decision in Mitchell is
that, despite his emphasis upon the historic origins of the Crown's
protection of Indians' personal property, he ignored historic Aboriginal
understandings of the Crown. Not only are his findings incongruous, but
they also contradict two Supreme Court of Canada precedents. His
position regarding the Crown's protection of Indians' personal property
ignored the Supreme Court's rejection of the frozen rights theory in
Sparrow, which was rendered less than one month before Mitchell.
16 7

See La Forest J.'s discussion in Mi.chel supra note 10 at 127-36.
168 Ibid. at 140: "As I see it, if Parliament had intended to cast aside these traditional
constraints on the Crown's obligations to protect the property of Indians, it would have expressed
this in the clearest of terms."
169
Supra note 5.
170 Ibid. at 1091-93. See also B. Slattery, supra note 3 at 782, who stated that the word
"existing" in section 35(1) suggests that Aboriginal and treaty rights "are affirmed in a
contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour." Slattery's statement was
approved by the Supreme Court in Sparrow,ibid. at 1092.
The Court's rejection of the frozen rights theory in Sparrow is also consistent with the
precedent it had established in R v. Big MDrugMart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 343-44, where the
majority dismissed the notion that a "frozen concepts" theory applied to the CanadianCharterof
RUghts and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11, by holding that the Charter'sguarantee of rights was not confined to the status of
those rights when the Charter came into effect. Note, as well, the Supreme Court of Canada's
rejection of frozen rights theory in the Aboriginal rights context in Simon v. R ,[1985] 2 S.C.R. 387
at 399-400. See also B. Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights"
(1982-83) 8 Queen's LJ.232 at 262: "[T]he law should be regarded as always speaking, and as
applying to new circumstances as they arise."
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Moreover, his determination that Aboriginal characterizations of the
Crown, as an indivisible entity, does not reflect modem circumstances
runs contrary to the precedent established in Nowegijick, which held that
Aboriginal interpretations of words and legal concepts in Indian treaties
and statutes relating to Indians are to be preferred over more legalistic
and technical constructions. 171
Modem Aboriginal understandings of the Crown, as represented
in treaties and through the historical intercourse of governmental
authorities and First Nations in Canada, are founded on understandings
passed from generation to generation, and dating back to the various
bases of the Crown's fiduciary obligations. They consistently regard the
Crown as a unifted whole with whom treaties were signed and compacts
made. 172 La Forest J.'s characterization of Aboriginal understandings of
the Crown in Mitchell, on the other hand, reflects the common law's
tendency to attempt to understand Aboriginal conceptions exclusively by
analogy with common law ideas rather than by viewing them on their
own terms.173
The problems associated with attempts to understand Aboriginal
conceptions exclusively by reference to common law ideas are reflected
by the growing trend in Canadian Aboriginal rights jurisprudence to
describe Aboriginal rights as sui generis.174 The notion that Aboriginal
rights do not necessarily correspond, however, to rights that are
comprehensible or recognizable only at common law is not an entirely
recent phenomenon. It may be traced back to the early nineteenth
century, at which time it occupied a primary role in one of the United
States Supreme Court's earliest decisions on Aboriginal rights, Johnson
and Graham'sLessee v. M'Intosh.175 The case centred around competing
claims of ownership of former Indian land. Chief Justice John Marshall
ultimately ruled in favour of the defendant, who had purchased title
171 See supra note 83. It should be noted that while La Forest J. agreed with Nowegijick's
interpretive principles as they applied to Indian treaties, he held that "somewhat different
considerations must apply in the case of statutes relating to Indians": MitcheU, supranote 10 at 14243.
172 See, for example, Price, supra note 28; Fumoleau, supra note 28; Morris, supra note 146;
and H. Cardinal, The Unjust Society (Edmonton: Mel Hurtig, 1969).
173

See Price, ibid.; Fumoleau, ibid.; Hurley, supra note 34; Ambiguous IroquoisEmpim supra
note 146; Empire ofFortune,supra note 146; and Morris, ibid.
1 74
Suigeneris has been defined as "[o]f their own kind or class": see Black's Law Dictionary,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1979) at 1286. The concept of describing Aboriginal rights as sui
generis is discussed in greater detail in JJ. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of
Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make A Difference?" [forthcoming].
175 8 Wheat. 543 (U.S. 1823) [hereinafter Johnson].
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from the United States government, and against the plaintiff, the
successor-in-title of a colonist who had purchased the land from its
original Indian owners. In rendering his decision, Marshall C.J. did not
dispute the validity of the defendant's title under Indian law. He held,
however, that it was unenforceable by American courts since it was the
creature of a separate legal system and thereby governed by its laws:
If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or, in other words,
might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title. Admitting their power to change
their laws or usages ... still it is a part of their territory, and is held under them, by a title
dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and ... the courts
of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who
purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them,
so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and
subject to their laws. ... The plaintiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the
courts of the United States.1 76

The special, sui generis nature of aboriginal rights was later
recognized by the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary,
Southern Nigeria.177 In that case, Viscount Haldane, commenting upon
the nature of aboriginal land tenure in West Africa, issued a warning
about the judiciary's interpretation of rights that were not formulated
within the confines of the common law:
Their Lordships make the preliminary observation that in interpreting the native title to
land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire, much caution is
essential. There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render that title
conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under
English law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely.178

In Canada, the courts have overtly described Indian treaties,179
the Crown-Native fiduciary relationship,18 0 Aboriginal title,181 and

176 Ibid.at 593 and at 605.
177 [1921] 2 A.C. 399 [hereinafterAmodu Tijani].
178

Ibid. at 402-03.

179 See Simon v.1R, supra note 170 at 404: "An Indian treaty is unique; it is an agreement sul
generiswhich is neither created nor terminated according to the rules of international law;" and R v.
Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1039.
180 See Guerii supra note 1 at 384-85.
181 See, for example, Guerin,/bid.at 382; Paulv. CanadianPacific Ltd.,supra note 7 at 678-79;
Roberts v. Canada,supra note 7 at 336-38; Sparrow,supra note 5 at 1108; MitchelU supra note 10 at
108-09; Apsassin, supra note 4 at 78 and at 83; and Skenyvore Ratepayers'Ass'nv. ShawanagaIndian
Band (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 390 (CA) at 400. Refer also to the High Court of Australia's decision in
Mabo v. QueenslandfNo.2J (1992), 175 C.LR. 1, especially at 59, per Brennan J.
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Aboriginal property rights1 8 2 as suigenieris. More recently, the dissenting
judgment of Lambert J.A. in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia stated that
"all aboriginal rights are sui generis."18 3 In making this statement,
Lambert J.A. expanded upon the sentiments expressed by Viscount
Haldane inAmodu Tijani:
I am satisfied that a jurisprudential analysis of the concepts underlying "rights" in
common law or western legal thought is of little or no help in understanding the rights
now held by aboriginal peoples and now recognized and affirmed by the common law and
by the Constitution. ... And it is not only in relation to aboriginal title that trying to
describe the title in the terminology of common law tenures is both unnecessary and
misleading: trying to describe aboriginal rights in terms of rigorous western
jurisprudential analysis may well be equally unnecessary and misleading) 8 4

All of these cases recognize that Aboriginal conceptions and
understandings may not always correspond to their common law
counterparts. 8 5 It should not be surprising, then, that Aboriginal
understandings of the Crown differ from that held by the common law.
If the common law's view of the Crown differs from First
Nations' traditionally-held conceptions, it is incumbent upon the Crown
to ensure that the former is made evident to the First Nations. This
notion is both consistent with the interpretive principles enunciated in
Nowegijick1 86 and the requirements of fiduciary doctrine. Regardless,
any change in the understanding of the Crown may only affect the
remedies available for a breach of the Crown's fiduciary duties, rather

182 These rights include, but are not restricted to, Aboriginal cultural property and the right to
hunt and fish: see Sparrow,supra note 5 at 1112: "Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the
application of traditional common law concepts of property as they develop their understanding of
what the reasons for judgment in Guerin ... referred to as the sui generis' nature of aboriginal

rights."
183 Delgamuukw, BCCA, supra note 138 at 644.
18 4

Ibi.

185 See the discussion in Borrows & Rotman, supra note 174. Some of the sources that discuss
or contemplate differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal world views and ideological
conceptions include: little Bear, supra note 28; M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian
Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90) 6 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3; R.
Ridington, "Cultures in Conflict: The Problem of Discourse" in W.H.New, ed., Native Writers and
CanadianWriting (Vancouver. University of British Columbia Press, 1990) 273; R.A. Williams Jr.,
"Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American
Indian Cultural Context" (1990) 24 Ga. L. Rev. 1019; and "Aboriginal Concepts of Justice" in
Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, The Justice System and Aboriginal People: Report of the
AboriginalJustice InquiryofManitoba: PublicInquiry into the AdministrationofJustice andAboriginal
People, vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991) (Commissioners: A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair)
17.
186

Supra note 83.
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than the nature and extent of those duties or the legal requirement that
they be fulfilled. The passage of time does not forgive a fiduciary's
breach of duty, although, in certain circumstances, it may prevent the
bringing of an action for breach due to a lapse of statutory limitations or
7
laches.18
V. THE NEXUS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY
The principle of dividing obligations between the federal and
provincial Crowns is not unique to the Crown-Native fiduciary
relationship. Another example is the explicit sharing of legislative
power-and consequently legislative responsibility-between the federal
and provincial Crowns relating to agriculture and immigration under
section 95 of the British North America Act, 1867.188 The relationship
between power and responsibility18 9 was expressed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Sparrow, where the Court stated, in relation to the
nexus between section 91(24) of the British NorthAmerica Act, 1867 and
Act, 1982, that "federal power must be
section 35(1) of the Constitution
190
reconciled with federal duty."
Due to the absence of provincial participation in the majority of
the events giving rise to the Crown's fiduciary duties towards First
Nations, provincial obligations stem primarily from the provincialfederal distribution of legislative and authoritative responsibilities in
Canada. This entails an acceptance of both benefits and obligations
from the actions of the federal Crown after 1867 and from its
predecessors, including the British Crown, prior to 1867. Provincial
obligations also arise from direct provincial actions toward and
interaction with Aboriginal peoples.
The sharing of legislative responsibility over Aboriginal affairs
may be seen, for example, in the ability of provinces to pass legislation

187 By way of illustration, if it were determined that the French Crown possessed fiduciary
obligations to First Nations in Canada by virtue of its historic relationship with them, its loss of
sovereignty over Canada in 1760-61 would not terminate its liability for any breach of those
obligations, but, quite obviously, would severely limit the range of remedies that could be awarded
against it.
188
It should be noted that the doctrine of paramountcy is explicitly included so that provincial
legislation that is repugnant to federal law is rendered null and void to the extent of the repugnancy.
189
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
190 Spanow,supra note 5 at 1109.
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affecting Aboriginal peoples through section 88 of the Indian Act.191
Even though legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians" is an exclusive federal power under section 91(24) of the
British North America Act, 1867,192 section 88 of the IndianAct allows for
provincial laws of general application to be applied to status Indians 193
by referential incorporation, subject to the terms of Indian treaties, the
Indian Act itself, or other federal legislation. In light of the effects of
section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, however, the constitutional
validity of section 88 is questionable. 194
When provinces intrude upon the federal Crown's section 91(24)
legislative sphere, they cannot do so without affecting the nature and
scope of their own obligations to Native peoples. As Brian Slattery
explains: "[S]o long as the Provinces have powers and rights enabling
them to affect adversely Aboriginal interests protected by the
relationship, they hold attendant fiduciary obligations." 195 Provinces
thereby acquire some measure of the federal Crown's fiduciary
responsibilities when they pass legislation referentially under section 88
of the Indian Act, play an active role in the formulation of land

191 Section 88 reads:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general
application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of
Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act
or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent that
those laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this
Act.
192
The application of section 88 is a complicated matter. For further consideration of case
law dealing with the effect of section 88, refer to R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451 ("pith and
substance" rule); Kruegerand Manuel v. R, supra note 84, (whether provincial laws are of general
application and/or impair the status and capacity of Aboriginal peoples); FourB Manufacturingv.
United Garment Workers of America, supra note 35, (whether provincial laws are of general
application and/or impair the status and capacity of Aboriginal peoples); Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R.
309; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [19861 1 S.C.R. 285 (provincial laws may not interfere with treaty
rights); Slattery, supra note 3 at 775-81; Slattery, supra note 107 at 282-86; P. Macklem, "First
Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill
LU. 382 at 418-23 and at 435-45; and B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in
Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) 36 McGill
LJ. 308 at 371-80.
193 "Status Indians" is defined in sections 6 and 7 of the IndianAct.
194

See Slattery, note 107 at 284-86.

195

lbid. at 274. See also Slattery, supra note 3 at 755:
The federal Crown has primary responsibility toward native peoples under section 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867, and thus bears the main burden of the fiduciary trust. But
insofar as provincial Crowns have the power to affect native peoples, they also share in
the trnLt
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agreements concerning the establishment of Indian reserves, or actively
participate in the negotiation of Indian treaties and agreements.
The provinces have, for example, passed provincial legislation
that directly affects status Indians, including game and wildlife laws.
Ontario played an active role in formulating land agreements regarding
the establishment of Indian reserves, such as when it became involved in
the implementation of Treaty #3 and Treaty #9 reserves. Its role in
providing for the establishment of reserves under Treaty #3 is illustrated
by the sixth clause of An Act for the Settlement of Certain Questions
Between the Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting Indian
Lands, which states
[t]hat any future treaties with the Indians in respect of territory in Ontario to which they
have not before the passing of the said statutes surrendered their claim aforesaid, shall be
deemed to require the concurrence of the Government of Ontario.19 6

Similarly, Quebec's role in negotiating the James Bay and Northern
QuebecAgreement197 and in enacting the provincial legislation necessary

196

Supra note 81. Note also the obligations of Ontario and Quebec in the 1912 Ontario and
Quebec Boundary Extension Acts: Ontario Boundaries Extension Act, supra note 81; An Act to
Express the Consent of the LegislativeAssembly of the Province of Ontarioto an Fxtension of the Limits
of the Province, S.O. 1912, c. 3; Quebec BoundariesExtension Act, supra note 81; and An Act
Respecting the Extension of the Provinceof Quebec by the Annexation of Ungava, S.Q. 1912, c. 7, which
provide in section 2(a) of the federal Ontario Act and section 2(c) of the federal Quebec Act
[t]hat the province of ... will recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants in the territory
above described to the same extent, and will obtain surrenders of such rights in the same
manner, as the Government of Canada has heretofore recognized such rights and has
obtained surrender thereof, and the said province shall bear and satisfy all charges and
expenditure in connection with or arising out of such surrenders.
These provincially-obtained surrenders were subject, however, to the approval of the Governor
in Council (sections 2(b) and 2(d) respectively) and the "trusteeship of the Indians in the said
territory, and the management of... lands ... reserved for their use, shall remain in the government
of Canada" (sections 2(c) and 2(e) respectively).
197 James Bay and Northern QuebecAgreement (Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1976) along with
its implementing legislation, the.tames Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, S.C.
1976-77, c. 32. Similar situations include Quebee's role in the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, S.C.
1984, c. 18 and Ontario's part in negotiating with the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (NAN) to recognize
NAN self-government. Regarding the latter, see the Memorandum of Understanding dated 24
February 1986 between Ontario, the federal Crown, and NAN to enter into negotiations for the
purpose of recognizing NAN self-government within the context of Canadian Confederation. This
was followed by an Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 1 December 1989
and an Interim Measures Agreement dated 12 June 1990 regarding future development adjacent to
N reserve lands and lands claimed as NAN lands.
See also Morse, supranote 164 at 65:
The Ontario government subsequently obtained a guaranteed role in [Indian treaty]
negotiations, first with Treaty No. 9 and its adhesions as well as in the Williams Treaty of
1923. However, this was not truly due to any constitutional imperative, but rather it
reflected a federal willingness to include the province and a desire to shift some of the
financial burdens onto Ontario's shoulders.
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for its implementation 198 demonstrates active provincial participation in
the negotiation of Indian treaties and agreements.
The line between federal and provincial jurisdictional boundaries
is becoming increasingly blurred due to the effects of the Constitution
Ac4 1982. For this reason, it is likely that provinces will continue to
encroach even further upon the federal Crown's section 91(24)
jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" without
reproach. As Dickson C.J.C. noted in Mitchell, the "fluidity of
responsibility across lines of jurisdiction accords well with the fact that
the newly entrenched s. 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, applies to all
levels of government in Canada." 199 However, if there is to be a point
beyond which provincial action that is consistent with or in fulfilment of
its obligations to First Nations is deemed to be ultra vires, some judicial
definition of that line and of provincial fiduciary responsibilities to First
Nations is necessary. Otherwise, instances that approach or even cross
200
that line will be difficult, if not impossible, to regulate.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, provincial
governments now have a constitutional responsibility to act in a manner
consistent with the furtherance of the Aboriginal and treaty rights
guaranteed in section 35(1)2 ° 1 In light of the Sparrow decision, this

arguably entails an obligation to actively and purposively promote or
further the rights protected within section 35(1).202 This latter notion
has since been affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Eastmain
03
Band.2
A duty to act purposively, as indicated in Sparrow, does not
require the Crown to seek prior court approval of legislative or policy
198

See An Act respectinghuntingandfishing rights in the James Bay and New Quebec Territories,
S.Q. 1978, c. 92; The Cree Vlldages Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 88; and An Act respectingthe land regime in the
James Bay andNew Quebec Tenitouies, S.Q. 1978, c. 93.
199
Supra note 10 at 109.
200 Of course, there is always the possibility that agreements between the federal and
provincial governments may resolve this problem before it arises and without the need for judicial
intervention, as with previous intergovernmental agreements discussed above.
201 Note Dickson CJ.C.'s comments in Mitchely, supra note 10 at 109.
202 See Sparrow, supra note 5 at 1106: "The nature of s. 35(1) itself suggests that it be
construed in a purposive way."
203 Supra note 4.
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initiatives that affect Indians qua Indians. It does insist, however, that in
light of the historic relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples, the Crown must maintain its honour, integrity, and avoid sharp
practice in all of its dealings with them.2 04
Under the rubric of section 35(1), and Sparrow's suggestions as
to its proper method of interpretation, a province may exempt
Aboriginal peoples from certain provincial laws or regulations-what
may otherwise appear to be facially-neutral legislation-due to the
differential impact that those laws or regulations may have upon First
o
This type of activity, however, prima facie amounts to
Nations 205
legislation in respect of Indians qua Indians, which falls under the
federal government's section 91(24) jurisdiction. Prior to the existence
of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, there is little doubt that such provincial
activity would have been declared ultravires, and thereby rendered void.
After the enactment of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, the situation
changed dramatically. When a provincial legislative initiative exempts
Aboriginal peoples in recognition of their Aboriginal and treaty rights
under section 35(1), it will be validated by section 52(1) of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982.06 Section 52(1) proclaims the Constitution of
Canada-including the purposive application of section 35(1) rights-to
be the supreme law of Canada. The extent to which a province may act,
however, in accordance with the furtherance of section 35(1) rights,
before it infringes upon the federal Crown's exclusive jurisdiction over
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" under section 91(24), is a
207
point of contention that has yet to be resolved.
In light of the judicial entrenchment of the Crown's fiduciary
obligations in Guerin,208 the constitutional responsibility of the federal
and provincial Crowns to purposively act to further the Aboriginal and
treaty rights contained within section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,
the nexus between governmental power and responsibility, the link
between the division or sharing of power and resultant benefits, the
2 04

This is emphasized through its reliance upon the precedent established in R v. Taylor and
Williams (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.).
2 05
See, for example, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources' Interim Enforcement Policy,
dated 28 May 1991, which details the province's relaxed regulation of Aboriginal hunting and fishing
rights in Ontario.
2 06
Slattery, supra note 107 at 284, note 75, corroborates the notion that a province may pass
legislation directed at Aboriginal peoples if the effect of the legislation is to grant exemptions to
them in recognition of their Aboriginal and treaty rights.
2 07
See supranotes 199 and 200 and accompanying text.
208 Supra note 1.
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inferences of provincial duties owed to First Nations in the St

Catherine'sMilling20 9 and trilogy cases, 210 and the more recent judicial

suggestions regarding provincial fiduciary responsibilities owed to
Aboriginal peoples, the notion that provincial Crowns owe fiduciary
obligations to First Nations is ready for explicit judicial recognition.
While Canadian Aboriginal rights jurisprudence has yet to
authoritatively endorse the existence of provincial fiduciary
responsibilities towards First Nations, the strong inferences of provincial
liability in Bear Island2 11 and Cree Regional Authority,212 for example,
indicate that Canadian courts may soon be prepared to move in that
direction.

209 Supra note 6.
210 Robinson TreatiesAnnuities, supranote 16; Seybold, supra note 17; and Treaty #3Annuties,
supra note 18.
211
Supra note 7.
212 Supra note 4.

